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ABSTRACT 
Extra-state war, a conflict between a state and non-state actor outside of the state’s borders, 
is an understudied phenomenon. In order to begin a discussion on this topic, this paper 
seeks to understand the factors that affect extra-state war duration. Using literature on 
interstate and intrastate wars, I hypothesize that military intervention in support of the non-
state actor, an equitable distribution of third-party military interventions, and economic 
intervention in the form of support will increase war duration. I also hypothesize that 
military intervention on behalf of the state and diplomatic intervention by a third party will 
decrease duration. I test my hypotheses using a multi-method resource design. First, using 
quantitative data drawn from extra-systemic wars between 1816 and 2007, I find support 
for the hypothesis that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor increases 
duration. In addition, I find that military intervention on behalf of the state also increases 
war duration. I supplement my regression analysis with a series of case studies on the 
Western Saharan War, Cisplatine War, and Mozambican War of Independence. I find that 
an equitable distribution of military interventions as well as economic support increase 
duration. Diplomatic intervention, on the other hand, decreases war duration. Taken 
together, my findings suggest that the various forms of intervention play a crucial role in 
explaining extra-state war duration. 
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Introduction 
 Within security studies, war is studied from beginning to end. There are numerous 
works on causation, termination, and the success of peace negotiations. Squeezed in 
between the studies on causation and termination is the less-discussed topic of war 
duration. Understanding the variables that influence war duration and to what extent is 
crucial from both a theoretical and policy perspective. Wars inevitably take up resources 
and human lives. Therefore, an understanding of what can either shorten or elongate a 
war can help save these same resources and lives. 
 War itself comes in various forms. The three major types of wars are interstate, 
intrastate, and extra-state. Interstate wars refer to the traditional state vs. state conflict. 
Intrastate or civil wars occur when citizens or members of the same country fight each 
other within a country’s borders. Lastly, extra-state wars are conflicts between a state 
actor and a non-state actor outside of the state’s borders. Although interstate and 
intrastate wars have been extensively studied, extra-state wars are nearly neglected. This 
neglect is unfortunate since extra-state wars are rising in frequency with the emergence of 
numerous terrorist and guerilla organizations. However, it should be noted that extra-state 
wars are not a new phenomenon. There have been almost 200 cases of extra-state wars in 
the last 200 years or so. Yet, due to the dearth of research on this topic, we do not have 
any means of explaining extra-state war duration. 
 What explains extra-state war duration? In interstate and intrastate war duration 
research, intervention is a commonly assessed variable. In many studies, intervention 
becomes key to explaining war duration. Much like war, intervention also comes in many 
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forms. Military intervention involves a third party contributing soldiers to the war, and 
therefore becoming an active actor within the conflict. Economic intervention can come 
in two forms: support and sanctions. Economic support occurs when a third party 
provides financial aid, training, and arms. Economic sanctions refer to when a third party 
restricts trade or the flow of capital to the actors involved in the conflict. Lastly, 
diplomatic intervention occurs when a third party enters the conflict with the sole purpose 
of mediating and ending the war.  
 The question now is how does intervention factor into extra-state war duration? 
This question is not only specifically inquiring about intervention in extra-state war 
duration, but is also attempting to begin a much-needed discussion and analytical debate 
on how extra-state wars fit into our conceptualization of international conflicts. 
 
Literature Review  
There has been a large number of works in recent years dedicated to the coined 
phrase, “the changing character of war.”1 This group of literature argues that we are 
witnessing a change in war types and tactics.2 More specifically, we are now witnessing 
the rise of insurgency groups, guerilla tactics, and prevalent non-state actors. 
Consequently, these works assume that non-state groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda are 
recent phenomena. Built into this assumption is the idea that prior to the latter half of the 
20th century, wars either fell into two categories: interstate and intrastate. Another 
                                               
1 Hew Stratchan, The Changing Character of War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
2 Michael Fowler, Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict, (Westport: Praeger 
Security International, 2005). 
K. J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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category does exist. Extra-state wars may seem prevalent in today’s international 
environment, but they are far from new or rare. Judging from how often extra-state wars 
take place, the International Relations and policy-making community would benefit 
greatly from further research on the matter. This literature review will show that that 
research on extra-state war duration is nonexistent. This research attempts to fill that 
niche through assessing the relationship between intervention and extra-state war 
duration. 
 Extra state war can be defined as a conflict between a state and a non-state actor 
outside of the state’s borders.3 A non-state actor can include any group that is not 
recognized as part of the international state system. Therefore, this term includes guerilla 
groups, colonies, and even unrecognized nations. Colonial (wars of decolonization) and 
imperial (wars of conquest/colonization) wars are the two main subsets of conflict that 
fall under the extra-state umbrella. To give some historical perspective, the American 
Revolution was a colonial extra-state war between Great Britain (the state) and the 
Continental Army (the non-state actor). Even though the present-day U.S. was a group of 
colonies controlled by Great Britain at the time, these colonies were nonetheless outside 
what were considered Great Britain’s official borders. Examples of imperial extra-state 
wars range from the Second Opium war (Great Britain vs. the Qings) to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq (U.S. vs. Al Qaeda/Iraqi Shia militias).  
                                               
3 Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816 – 2007, (Washington DC: CQ Press, 
2010). 
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 Examples of extra-state wars in both distant and recent history are plenty. What is 
not plenty is the amount of academic and analytical research dedicated to understanding 
the nuances and factors of extra-state warfare. Moreover, with extra-state wars recently 
becoming especially significant in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, war 
duration and termination become highly relevant.  It is in most of the international 
community’s interest to contain these conflicts and eventually find resolutions. We have 
seen in Syria and Afghanistan, just to name a couple, how large-scale conflicts have 
attracted interveners from other states. These states intervene with varying interests, but 
at the end of the day, are attempting to end the war with conditions favorable to their 
side.  
 Intervention can be defined in many ways. In the following literature review, I 
will look at a couple interpretations of what intervention looks like and assess whether 
these definitions are applicable to this line of research. This research is novel in that no 
other academic has attempted to empirically or theoretically assess the effect of 
intervention on extra-state war duration. On the other hand, there has been plenty of 
empirical research on intrastate and interstate war duration. Therefore, the beginnings of 
understanding extra-state warfare will be based on previous work intrastate and interstate 
warfare. Although extra-state, interstate, and intrastate wars are all qualitatively different 
and a characteristic of one type of war will not necessarily apply to another, these are the 
constraints in which this research must work in. Apart from the definition of an extra-
state war, there is a dearth of theory on this type of war. Contrastingly, intervention and 
its implications on conflicts have been thoroughly studied. Many theoretical works on 
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intervention focus on the ethics of humanitarian intervention and normative suggestions 
for future interventions.4 However, the ethics of intervention is not within the scope of 
this paper’s research question. Instead, this theoretical section will focus on a few 
definitions of interventions and arguments about war termination with a short Kantian 
normative introduction.  
 In “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Immanuel Kant states his fifth 
tenant for peace as “No state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government 
of another state.” Although not explicitly stated, this refers to unwelcome intervention. 
Kant’s normative suggestion and rejection of intervention refers to interstate conflicts. 
However, in his explanation of this tenant, he does limit his declaration by stating that 
when a state enters a civil war, and is hence broken up into multiple quasi-states, 
assistance to one faction, in the hopes of avoiding anarchy, would not be considered a 
constitutional interference.5 This is the type of intervention we see in extra-state wars, 
though the “assistance” may be for either the state or non-state actor and is almost always 
welcome to the receiving side. However, an extra-state war is not a civil war. Kant’s 
caveat on civil wars and preventing anarchy cannot always apply to extra-state wars 
because these wars do not necessarily invoke the potential for anarchy. On the other 
                                               
4 Eric A. Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War: The Ethics, Law, and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2009).  
Ciaran Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention, (London: Hart Publishing Ltd, 
2013).  
J. L. Holzgrefe, Robert O. Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Stanley Hoffman, Robert C.  Johansen, James P. Sterba, The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian 
Intervention, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1996). 
Jonathan Moore, Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention, (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1998). 
5 Immanuel Kant, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” (1795). 
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hand, extra-state wars have been known to cause enough chaos to the point that anarchy 
may not seem so far away. Today’s Syria is a combination of intrastate, extra-state, and 
proxy inter-state wars. Found within this medley is the destruction of state and governing 
institutions. Under Kant’s theory, this situation may ethically permit interventions. The 
main takeaway from Kant is that he helps us define intervention as some form of 
“interference.” However, we do need to look to other sources to find a more specific 
definition. 
In his book, Political Theory and International Relations, Charles Beitz spends a 
section discussing intervention. Although most of this section focuses on what 
conditions, if any, would make an intervention ethically permissible, Beitz does allot 
some space to discussing the definition of intervention. He first offers a widely used 
definition of intervention. He states that intervention has been interpreted as “all actions 
and policies that constitute impermissible interference in a state’s internal affairs.”6 
Almost immediately, Beitz acknowledges that this definition is extremely broad and 
encompasses almost any action taken by a state in an international context. I have a 
similar issue with this definition. When discussing interventions in extra-state wars, we 
have to understand that not all interventions are unwelcome. For example, in the Soviet 
Quagmire in Afghanistan, the Mujahedeen welcomed Pakistan’s military equipment, 
training, and bases. In turn, Pakistan welcomed U.S. economic and military support. 
These are categorized as interventions, but not necessarily “impermissible.” Nonetheless, 
                                               
6 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1979), 74. 
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Beitz does add onto the base definition that Kant provided by specifying “actions and 
policies” as the mechanism for interventions.  
 In his book, Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention, Anthony 
Lang adds to the ethical debate on military and humanitarian interventions. Although the 
ethical aspect of intervention is not this paper’s focus, this research benefits from the 
definitions of intervention given in these various works. Lang defines military 
intervention as the “use of armed troops to effect a change in the political system of a 
sovereign state without prior permission and without declaring war.”7 He admits that this 
definition does not take into account the full spectrum of intervention, but it serves his 
purpose of the ethical dimension of unwelcome interventions.8 Moreover, he argues that 
when a state intervenes, it seeks to create a political order in the other state modelled after 
its own politics.9  
As mentioned before, “unwelcome” interventions are not the only type of intervention 
this research is seeking to unpack. However, the idea that a military intervention involves 
some form of armed forces meant to alter the situation at hand fits into the type of 
interventions found in extra-state wars. Furthermore, Lang even touches on the topic of 
diplomatic intervention by stating that diplomacy provides a space where conflicts can be 
resolved.10 Inadvertently, Lang is moving into the realm of war duration and how this one 
type of intervention can help reduce the potential duration of a conflict.  
                                               
7 Anthony Lang, Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention, (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002), 3. 
8 Ibid., 4. 
9 Ibid., 5. 
10 Ibid., 193. 
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To complete a working definition of intervention, Patrick Regan’s 1998 article, 
“Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice,” 
will be considered. Regan defines intervention “convention breaking military and/or 
economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority 
structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the 
government and opposition forces.”11 Although comprehensive and applicable to my 
study, this definition does not incorporate diplomatic intervention nor does it 
acknowledge the possibility of an intervention aimed at the authority structures of a non-
state group. With the addition of those two caveats, this definition will be the one used 
going forward when discussing intervention. 
Fred Iklé’s book, Every War Must End, contributes a succinct overview on some war 
duration theories. Iklé argues that even if governments have a purpose for fighting, they 
do not have clear war aims. Hence, they start a war without really knowing how to finish 
it, prolonging the conflict.12 According to him, nations seek out peace settlements that 
will bring about better conditions for the two nations than before the outbreak of war. 
However, as each side attempts to improve their position for possible future conflict, they 
risk losing the ongoing war.13 Therefore, wars are prolonged while peace settlements are 
postponed as states try to reach for a higher position. He also argues that top government 
leaders make decision that allow wars to go past their “rational” end. A “rational” end 
would be for a war to end at a situation better than before. However, government leaders 
                                               
11 Patrick Regan, “Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions in Internal Conflicts,” The Journal of 
Politics 60, no. 3 (1998). 
12 Fred Charles Ikle, Every War Must End, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 5. 
13 Ibid., 10. 
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do not allow new battlefield information to change or shape their initial broad war aims, 
causing wars to continue far past their “rational” end. According to Iklé, if decision were 
rational, wars should be just as easy to get out of then to get into.14  
        Iklé argues that the larger a war effort, the more committed a state becomes to 
their initial conditions of peace, making it more difficult to arrive at a settlement.15 
Moreover, during a war, there is an intense domestic struggle on what would constitute as 
a “good” end to the war. War doves and hawks battle each other and create 
indecisiveness for a peace settlement. However, Iklé argues that this conflict between 
doves and hawks is actually preceded by a conflict over war aims. This political struggle 
intrudes on further formulation of war aims, colors military estimates, and inhibits 
negotiation with the enemy.16 
 In Military Intervention in Civil Wars, Bertil Duner delineates the various forms 
of military intervention. He argues that non-intervention has gradually become outmoded 
due to the international structural changes like transnationalism, economic 
interdependence, and globalism.17  He outlines direct combat, indirect combat, direct 
para-combat, and indirect para-combat, stating that each form of intervention involves a 
different number of troops, type of operation and interests.18 Therefore, the form of 
intervention is very pertinent to how it affects the duration and resolution of the conflict. 
                                               
14 Ibid., 16. 
15 Ibid., 42. 
16 Ibid., 84. 
17 Bertil Duner, Military Intervention in Civil Wars: The 1970s, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 4. 
18 Ibid., 17. 
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 Most works on war duration fall under the neo-positivist umbrella of International 
Relations and attempt to use empirical models/statistics to support their arguments. 
Although many of these works touch on interstate and intrastate war duration, there is 
virtually no research on extra-state war duration. Moreover, there is no consensus on how 
intervention or what types of intervention effect war duration. 
 Research has been conducted on the role of regime types, intervention, 
bargaining, information, effectiveness, economics, and initiation. Interestingly, there has 
not been a consensus on the how third-party intervention affects the duration of a war. 
Moreover, several researchers, like Gartner and Siverson, have argued that since initiators 
of war select target actors that will probably not receive third-party help, there is a drastic 
selection bias when attempting to conduct quantitative research on interventions in 
conflicts.19 Similarly, Wood, Kathman, and Gent state that third-party actors intervene 
when they expect to have the greatest impact, and hence hope to shift the balance of 
power. Moreover, the degree to which the intervention influences the outcome/duration is 
determined by the strength of the intervention. Researchers need to take these conditions 
into account when deciding to study the role of intervention in war duration.20 
 Goemans touched on the effect of regime type on war duration, concluding that 
wars with mixed regimes will last longer. Mixed regimes will face harsh punishment 
regardless of whether they lose a war moderately or dismally, motivating those leaders to 
                                               
19 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Randolph Siverson, “War Expansion and War Outcome,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 40, no. 1 (1996). 
20 Reed Wood, Jacob Kathman, Stephen Gent, “Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate 
Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 5 (2012). 
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continue a war in a gamble to escape punishment.21 Mousseau also studied how regime 
types affect interstate conflict duration and found that democratic dyads are not only less 
likely to begin a war, but are more likely to compromise before the conflict escalates into 
a full-fledged war.22 These findings are coupled with other research that found that 
democracies are more likely to win wars because they select themselves into conflicts 
they can win.23 Contrastingly, Werner’s research concluded that regime type has no effect 
on the terms of settlement.24 
 Weisiger found that interstate conflict will lead to a quicker settlement when the 
overall level of fighting is relatively intense, recent fighting was unusually intense, and 
when there have been substantial shifts in battlefield success.25 Nilsson disproves the 
assumption of the offense-defense theory that wars are shorter when offense has the 
advantage. In actuality, asymmetric information about expected offensive capacity tends 
to lengthen wars.26 Slantchev argues that initiators of war tend to do badly the longer the 
war progresses because initiators are slow to update their outcome estimates after the 
                                               
21 H. E. Goemans, “Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War,” The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 44, no. 5 (2000). 
22 Michael Mousseau, “Democracy and Compromise in Militarized Interstate Conflicts,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42, no. 2 (1998). 
23 Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998). 
Dan Reiter and Allan Stam, Democracies at War, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).  
David Clark, Reed William, “A Unified Model of War Onset and Outcome,” The Journal of Politics 65, 
no. 1 (2003). 
24 Suzanne Werner, “Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998). 
25 Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War 
Duration,” International Organization 70, no. 2 (2016). 
26 Marco Nilsson, “Offense-Defense Balance, War Duration, and the Security Dilemma,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 56, no. 3 (2012)  
Marco Nilsson, “War and Unreason: Bounded Learning Theory and War Duration,” Goteborg Studies in 
Politics (2010). 
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outbreak of war.27 Additionally, Thyne’s research found that when power consolidation 
within a government reduces the number of people who need to approve a settlement, 
conflicts will be shorter because it will be harder for others to derail an agreement.28 
 Cunningham, Gleditch, and Salehyan focus their research on non-state actors in 
intrastate conflicts. They argue that strong rebels will engage in shorter wars because they 
pose enough of a military challenge that the government will make concessions. Weak 
rebels, on the other hand, can operate in regional peripheries, defying government victory 
but not being strong enough to extract concessions, leading to longer wars. Ultimately, if 
the insurgents can find an alternative means to violence, but still get their political 
message across, the intrastate conflict will be shorter.29 Yet, if rebel groups have some 
sort of major funding, the war will be longer.30 Balcells and Kalyvas argue that irregular 
conflicts last longer than traditional conflicts because of the high level of civilian 
victimization and use of guerilla tactics.31 
Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom outline key structural indicators that may 
lengthen or shorten the duration of a civil war. Such characteristics for lengthening a civil 
war include low income per capita, high inequality, and a moderate degree of ethnic 
division. Indicators that may shorten a civil war are a decline in the price of export 
                                               
27 Branislav Slantchev, “How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace,” 
American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (2004). 
28 Clayton Thyne, “Information, Commitment, and Intra-War Bargaining: The Effect of Government 
Constraints on Civil War Duration,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 2 (2012). 
29 David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of 
Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution onlinefirst, (2009). 
30 James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others,” Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (2004). 
31 Laia Balcells, Stathis Kalyvas, “Does Warfare Matter? Severity, Duration, and Outcomes of Civil Wars,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 8 (2014). 
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commodities and external military intervention on the side of the rebels.32  Patricia 
Sullivan argues that higher troop commitments decreases duration while also increasing 
the chances of an intervening state winning.33 Along the same lines, Patrick Brandt 
argues that the larger the government’s military in a civil war, the shorter the war because 
the capability gap between the rebel forces and the government forces is larger. However, 
if intervention occurs on the side of the rebels, the duration of the civil war will be 
extended because the balance of power is slightly more equalized.34 
Similarly, Regan’s research found that the use of force by an intervener will 
shorten the expected duration of a civil war. Along those lines, an early intervention with 
force will shorten the conflict relative to a later use of force. According to Regan, an 
intervention right after the conflict begins is best for reducing duration, while subsequent 
interventions tend to lead to longer wars. As the war progresses for quite some time, 
mediation is once again helpful in shortening the expected duration.  However, unilateral 
intervention in support of the non-state actor early in the conflict will lengthen the 
duration. In addition, interventions that attract counter-interventions will increase the 
expected duration, especially when the intervening states are competing for influence in 
the war. Additionally, Regan and Aydin specify that intervention can be divided into 
military, economic, and diplomatic intervention, where each type functions differently. 
                                               
32 Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler, Mans Soderbom, “On the Duration of Civil War,” Journal of Peace 
Research 41, no. 3 (2004). 
33 Patricia Sullivan, “At What Price Victory? The Effects of Uncertainty on Military Intervention Duration 
and Outcome,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (2008). 
34 Patrick Brandt, David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Nicolai Petrovsky, Dagmar Radin, “When and How the 
Fighting Stops: Explaining the Duration and Outcome of Civil War,” Defence and Peace Economics 19, 
no. 6 (2008). 
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According to their research, civil war duration is decreased the most when diplomatic and 
economic interventions are combined. 35   
Escriba-Folch also touched on the role of economic intervention. His research 
found that sanctions and embargoes are effective measures in shortening intrastate 
conflicts, especially if the sanctions are imposed by an international organization of 
which the target state is a member.36  
Bennett and Stam used empirical data from all the interstate wars between 1816 
and 1985 in order to conclude that factors such as strategy, terrain, capabilities, and 
government type play key roles in interstate war duration. In their research, the data 
supported the hypothesis that wars will be shorter when more states are involved. 
According to them, as more states form coalitions, the benefits of victory will be 
distributed to the point that leaders will have a difficult time convincing their state to 
continue fighting.37 Their reasoning supports the findings of Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 
who state that negotiated settlement will be more likely if the value of payoffs from 
victory is reduced.38 
                                               
35  Patrick Regan, Allan Stam, “In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the 
Duration of Interstate Disputes,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (2000). 
Patrick Regan, “Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002) 
 Aysegul Aydin, Patrick Regan, “Networks of Third-Party Interveners and Civil War Duration,” European 
Journal of International Relations 18, no. 3 (2011). 
36 Abel Escriba-Folch, “Economic Sanctions and the Duration of Civil Conflicts,” Journal of Peace 
Research 47, no. 2 (2010). 
37 D. Scott Bennett, Allan Stam, “The Duration of Interstate Wars,” American Political Science Review 90, 
no. 2 (1996). 
D. Scott Bennett, Allan Stam, “Revisiting Predictions of War,” Conflict Management and Peace Science 
26, no. 3 (2009) 
38 T. David Mason, Patrick Fett, “How Civil Wars End,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 4 (1996). 
T. David Mason, Joseph Weingarten, Patrick Fett, “Win, Lose, or Draw: Predicting the Outcome of Civil 
Wars,” Political Research Quarterly 52, no. 2 (1999). 
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Contrasting to the position that intervention can lead to shorter wars, there is a 
group of researchers who argue that intervention actually lengthens a conflict. Vasquez 
argues that wartime alliances help reduce the cost of interstate war preparations by 
pooling resources, therefore sustaining wars for longer periods of time.39 Accordingly, 
Bueno de Mesquita’s research found that the duration of war is linked with increases in 
interstate systemic tightness. In other words, tighter alliances and blocs increase war 
duration and occurrence.40   
In terms of intrastate war, Balch-Lindsay argues that when both sides of the war 
have an equitable distribution of third-party intervention, the civil war will be extremely 
long. Third-party interventions increase the chance of stalemates which prolongs the 
conflict. However, when one side of the civil war has a higher degree of third-party 
support, the expected duration will decrease.41 Arguing against Balch-Lindsay, Gates and 
Lujala found that interventions on the government side of a civil war specifically will 
increase duration.42 
Elbadawi also touches on intervention in civil wars. His research found that since 
external intervention reduces the cost of either coordinating or fighting a rebellion, the 
duration of a civil war will increase.43 Cunningham argues that when an intrastate conflict 
                                               
39 John Vasquez, The War Puzzle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
John Vasquez, The War Puzzle Revisited, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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has more than two actors, war duration will increase. He outlines that this is the case 
because there will be fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more 
likely to occur, and shifting alliances make negotiation more difficult.44 Along the same 
lines, Shirkey found that when third parties enter an interstate conflict later, it 
complicates the bargaining by adding new issues to the war and increasing uncertainty 
about the balance of forces. In effect, more information will be needed to find an 
agreement which means there will be additional fighting and a longer war.45 His 
argument relies on Langlois and Langlois’ research on information updating. They argue 
that fighting informs concessions and bargaining.46 
There is another group of researchers who, rather than assessing intervention’s 
role in war duration, research the role of intervention in peace-making. Walter argues that 
third-party intervention is needed to guarantee a civil war settlement and provide security 
for both sides.47 Regan agrees with this and states that a combination of economic and 
diplomatic intervention is an effective way of conflict management.48 DeRouen similarly 
                                               
44 David Cunningham, “Veto Players and Civil War Duration,” American Journal of Political Science 50, 
no. 4 (2006). 
45 Zachary Shirkey, “When and How Many: The Effects of Third-Party Joining on Causalities and Duration 
in Interstate Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 2 (2012). 
46 Jean Pierre Langlois, Catherine Langlois, “Does the Principle of Convergence Really Hold? War, 
Uncertainty, and the Failure of Bargaining,” British Journal of Political Science 42, no. 3 (2012). 
47 Barbara Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” International Organization 51, no. 3 
(1997). 
Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement to Civil Wars, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 
48 Patrick Regan, Aysegul Aydin, “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 50, no. 5 (2006). 
17 
 
argues that UN intervention increases the chances of a conflict ending in a treaty or 
truce.49  
All the research mentioned is empirically sound and thorough. Each researcher 
has done their best to assess war duration and outcome. They found key insights into war 
operation and factors affecting said operation. After assessing the literature, it seems that 
the effect of intervention is highly dependent on the type of intervention, what side the 
intervention is on, balance of power, and the characteristics of the conflict itself. 
However, there are a few gaps in the literature. 
Although interstate and intrastate conflict have been meticulously researched, 
extra-state war has been unfortunately neglected. There have been no major findings on 
extra-state war duration and outcome. Although extra-state conflicts are not as 
widespread as civil wars nor as large-scale as interstate wars, there have been almost 200 
cases of it in just the past 200 or so years. In fact, extra-state war is becoming 
increasingly pertinent to world affairs when taking terrorist organizations into account. 
With its importance on the rise, more research needs to be conducted on extra-state war 
duration and outcome. Factors that either shorten, lengthen, or settle a conflict are 
extremely useful for states that have found themselves embroiled in such conflicts.  
Furthermore, although the relationship between intervention and war duration has 
been revisited countless times, there is no consensus on how intervention affects war 
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duration. Empirical data on this topic needs to be further investigated in order to get one 
step closer to describing the reality of intervention on war duration. 
This research project will fill that gap in war duration literature by assessing 
intervention on extra-state war duration. Research on this topic is very much needed in 
order to give policymakers and leaders a fuller picture on how various factors may affect 
different types of war. As seen by the literature, factors such as intervention, economics, 
and capabilities react differently when assessed in an interstate setting or an intrastate 
setting. There is no reason to believe otherwise when assessing extra-state conflicts. By 
using a mix empirical analysis and case studies, this research will add to the ongoing 
debate about the effect of third-party intervention in war. However, it will also begin a 
new debate on what influences extra-state warfare and what states can expect when 
entering into one. 
 
Theoretical Puzzle 
If we were to only use the existing literature, we would be forced to apply the 
theories on intrastate war duration to extra-state war duration. This application would 
require an assumption that civil wars and extra-state wars have many overlapping 
characteristics. It is true that both types of wars involve a state actor and a non-state actor 
and typically fall under either a colonial or imperial conflict. When looking at basic 
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descriptive statistics from 1816 to 2007, extra-state wars and interstate wars have similar 
average durations with about 100 days (or 3 months) of difference.50 
However, civil war theory cannot be extended to extra-state wars because of the 
various factors and nuances unique to extra-state warfare. In intrastate wars, the conflict 
may between multiple non-state factions or between the state and a non-state actor. In 
both situations, all the actors belong to the same state and tend to fight within those 
borders. In extra-state wars, the conflict is characterized by a state and a non-state actor 
that is outside of the state’s borders. In most civil wars, the state actor is pulled into a war 
against a non-state actor because that non-state group poses a direct threat to state 
security and government rule. Due to the geographic distance between the state and non-
state actor in extra-state wars, the state does not usually face an existential threat from the 
non-state actor, and therefore has more of a choice on whether to enter into a war with the 
non-state war.51 Moreover, terrain becomes a more salient issue when assessing extra-
state wars. In civil wars, both the state and non-state actor are indigenous to the land and 
therefore have a more equal footing when engaging in conflict in the country. With extra-
state wars, the information asymmetry on terrain knowledge is more obvious and the 
tooth-to-tail ratio is much larger. The non-state group has better leverage on the 
environment and guerilla tactics involving the terrain.52 
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The similar durations for extra-state and intra-state wars are puzzling. According 
to the literature, when given the choice, rational states enter into a conflict when they 
believe they will have the greatest impact and the greatest chance of success.53 However, 
for most civil wars, this choice is taken away due to the immediate security threat non-
state actors pose to the state’s control of the land. For extra-state wars, the greater choice 
(though not always present) of entering into a war with an external non-state actor is 
available for external states. Even if the state is attacked by the non-state actor, the state 
will most likely not face an existential threat due to the geographic distance and the large 
capability disparity between the state and non-state actor. These states have the 
opportunity to make the necessary calculations on whether their goals and interests will 
be met with the lowest potential costs of entering into an extra-state war. Hence, it is 
more likely that extra-state wars are fought by states which believe they have the upper 
hand and can resolve the conflict quickly.54 At times this assumption may have proven 
wrong when states were not prepared for guerilla tactics and the opposition’s resiliency.55 
Overall, the obvious military superiority of states and this choice of opting into “easy” 
wars should result in much lower durations than we see in intrastate wars. On the other 
hand, the larger tooth-to-teeth ratio and unfamiliarity with terrain from the state’s 
perspective would decrease the military asymmetry and may actually increase extra-state 
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duration. However, instead, we see similar durations between intrastate and extra-state 
wars. 
Due to the lack of research on extra-state warfare, we do not have available 
theories to help deconstruct the mechanics behind this type of war and understand what 
factors into its duration. It has been established that the characteristics of extra-state wars 
and intrastate wars are too different to apply overarching theories even if they have 
similar durations. Instead, we need to look for the factors behind extra-state duration and 
why it lasts as long as it does. Despite the presence of extra-state wars in the last 200 
years, this type of war has been undertheorized. In the last few years, we see a prevalence 
of these types of war when looking at Iraq, Afghanistan, and now Syria. Ultimately, we 
need to begin unpacking extra-state war duration and identify the various factors that 
contribute to it the same way other researchers have unpacked intra-state warfare. Only 
after doing this can we begin to compare extra-state and intra-state warfare and 
understand the nuances and relative consequences of each type of war. 
To start the line of research on extra-state warfare, this paper will argue that 
intervention is a key component in explaining extra-state war duration. I used the basis of 
Regan’s 1998 traditional definition of intervention in order for it to incorporate non-state 
actors. Intervention can be defined as convention-breaking military/economic/diplomatic 
activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of 
a state or non-state group with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the state 
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and the opposition forces.56 A third-party can be either a state or non-state actor. 
However, almost all cases of intervention in the last 200 years of extra-state warfare have 
been conducted by states.  Intervention is just one factor in explaining extra-state war 
duration, but it can help give key insights into how third-party support or lack thereof can 
influence the direction of the war. Literature on intrastate wars has shown that military, 
economic, and diplomatic support can sway the duration of the war. Now, it is time to see 
if this holds true for extra-state wars. 
 
Hypotheses 
A military intervention occurs when a third party contributes forces or military 
equipment to one of the sides of an extra-state war. When looking at military support 
theoretically, it seems straightforward that an addition of resources and actors would 
increase the duration of a war by giving the needed materials to continue fighting for 
longer.57 However, within intrastate war literature, military intervention can bring about 
mixed results. For example, if a military intervention occurs on behalf of the state, it 
increases the already existing capability asymmetry and makes the defeat of the non-state 
actor quicker.58 On the other hand, if the non-state actor receives military support, the 
imbalance is lessened, allowing for a longer conflict.59 
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I argue that for extra-state wars, military intervention on the side of the non-state 
actor will increase duration. It has been argued that an increase in total military forces in 
a conflict will lengthen a war.60 This is because external interventions reduce the costs of 
coordinating a rebellion, hence making it more feasible to continue the conflict.61 
Furthermore, when conflicts have multiple actors, all these players need to approve a 
settlement. With more actors, there are fewer acceptable agreements due to information 
asymmetries, shifting alliances, and differing incentives.62 Ultimately, interventions 
lengthen wars because they complicate the bargaining process and push the chance of a 
successful settlement further down the road.63 
Some theorists like Bennett and Stam argue that when there is greater capability 
imbalance between the actors, we will see a shorter war.64 Correspondingly, stalemates 
and/or an equitable distribution of third party interventions on both sides will prolong 
wars because it decreases the imbalance.65 However, this idea that disparity in military 
capability leads to shorter wars is under the assumption that the actors are using 
conventional military operations. When it comes to counterinsurgency warfare, we need 
to take into account that rebels can easily withdraw, hide, regroup, and continue attacks 
                                               
60 Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998) 
61 Havard Hegre, “The Duration and Termination of Civil War,” The Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3 
(2004). 
62 David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of 
Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution onlinefirst, (2009). 
63 Zachary Shirkey, “When and How Many: The Effects of Third-Party Joining on Causalities and Duration 
in Interstate Wars,” Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 2 (2012). 
64 Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998) 
65 Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 
1880-1992,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 4 (2000). 
24 
 
during a conflict. They usually do not have a clear base and tend to blend into the 
population, making it difficult to find a target to attack. Ultimately, their strengths lie in 
the fact that they are able to wage offensive attacks against their opponent while also 
utilizing guerilla tactics as a defensive strategy.66 
If the non-state-side is given military support, the capability imbalance will be 
reduced. When on more equal footing, the conflict will lengthen because it will be more 
difficult for either side to gain the upper hand.67 The non-state actor started off in the 
conflict already aware of its many disadvantages against a professional state military. 
With additional military support and legitimization from a third-party actor, the non-state 
actor will receive a boost in morale and fighting power, allowing it to continue 
participating in the conflict. In fact, if conventional military operations already had a 
difficult time attacking the elusive non-state actor, the situation would only become more 
difficult as the rebel group gains more resources to continue its guerilla warfare. 
Furthermore, with interventions, there is an increase in the number of invested actors and 
therefore an increase in the number of actors who need to settle on a negotiation, 
lengthening the conflict due to the delay in settlement.68 
  
Hypothesis 1: Military intervention in support of the non-state actor will increase the 
duration of the war. 
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         Researchers like Cunningham and Shirkey often state that interventions lengthen 
the duration of a war because it complicates the bargaining process. In other words, it 
takes more time and effort to placate the added actors in the conflict. I argue, however, 
that when an intervention takes place on the side of the state, extra-state war duration will 
decrease. This argument mainly rests on the theory that the greater the military capability 
asymmetry, the shorter the war.69 In any conflict involving a state and a non-state actor, 
the state actor is has more resources and a larger military. The imbalance already exists. 
Therefore, when a third party actor contributes military support, that imbalance grows. In 
effect, the state actor has greater capabilities and renewed optimism to defeat the non-
state actor. This, of course, widely depends on the amount of military support and the 
already existing capabilities of the state. 
It is true that the non-state actor can utilize their guerilla tactics to evade state 
attacks as they previously had done and regroup. However, with added forces or 
resources, the state can better locate and attack non-state targets. Going back to 
Cunningham and Shirkey, it would seem more difficult to reach a negotiated settlement 
when more actors are involved. However, if a state can attract enough military support to 
severely weaken the non-state actor, there may be no need for a “negotiated” settlement. 
Instead, the state would have full control over the non-state actor’s domain and future. 
Moreover, the military intervention on the side of the state would increase the intensity of 
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the conflict eventually past the breaking point for the non-state actor, making settlement 
occur quicker.70 
  
Hypothesis 2: Military intervention on the side of the state will decrease duration. 
  
When both sides have equitable third-party military support, the war will likely 
turn towards a stalemate, lengthening the conflict.71 If an extra-state conflict has already 
transformed into a war, then the state was not strong enough to defeat the non-state actor 
off the bat. Rather, the non-state actor was able to use its unconventional tactics and 
knowledge of the terrain to evade attacks and regroup.72 Therefore, when both sides of 
the conflict receive military aid, it gives them the ability to continue the conflict for a 
longer period of a time. 
Pooling of resources and the increase of total military forces within a conflict 
contribute to the “means” of continuing a conflict.73 Without additional resources, we 
would see that both sides would eventually reach their breaking point where the costs of 
the war were outweighing the potential benefits. However, with equitable military 
support, that breaking point becomes farther away. Furthermore, if both sides were 
                                               
70 Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War 
Duration,” International Organization 70, no. 2 (2016). 
71 Dylan Balch-Lindsay, Andrew Enterline, “Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 
1880-1992,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 4 (2000). 
72 David Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan, “It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of 
Civil War Duration and Outcome,” Journal of Conflict Resolution onlinefirst, (2009). 
73 John Vasquez, The War Puzzle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 183. 
Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998). 
27 
 
considering negotiated settlement, but were offered military aid, they would aim to get 
their optimal settlement rather than compromising. Since neither side would want to 
compromise at that point, we would see a reversion back to the conflict, eventually 
leading to a stalemate. 
  
Hypothesis 3: If there is an equitable distribution of third party military interventions, war 
duration will increase. 
  
Diplomatic intervention is in reference to a neutral third party actor acting as a 
mediator in hopes of resolving and ending the conflict at hand. Without diplomatic 
interventions, negotiated settlements are very difficult to come by. Each side will use 
extreme bargaining in hopes of getting their optimal settlement. However, this model 
would result in a prolonged war because a settlement would be difficult to achieve.74 
Without a third party to facilitate exchanging of information, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty, which in turn increases the expected duration of the war. Information 
acquired during the war does outweigh the information available prior to the outbreak of 
war but there are very few mechanisms to exchange and negotiate with this information.75 
Moreover, states are unwilling to negotiate with rebel groups, especially if they are 
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extreme or illegitimate.76 Therefore, without an avenue for negotiation or the proper 
exchange of information, wars continue on without an immediate end in sight. 
I argue that diplomatic interventions reduce duration by creating a negotiation 
space, improving the exchange of information. Moreover, diplomatic interventions tend 
to occur when a war is relatively destructive or already long.77 At that point, both parties 
are more amenable to a negotiated settlement in order to alleviate some of the economic 
and military burden. Furthermore, Barbara Walter argues that civil wars rarely end in 
negotiated settlements because without a neutral third party actor, there are no credible 
guarantees to decrease the level of insecurity between the main actors.78 By giving a 
credible security guarantee, diplomatic interventions not only help facilitate a settlement, 
but also help make sure the settlement is adhered to so that the conflict does not return. In 
terms of civil wars, Regan and Aydin used an empirical model to support the theory that 
diplomatic interventions do result in shorter wars.79 
 
Hypothesis 4: Diplomatic intervention by an international organization or neutral third 
party will decrease duration. 
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Economic sanctions refer to trade embargoes, limitations, and tariffs meant to 
send a message and coerce a state into acting along internationally accepted lines. It is 
very difficult to place sanctions on a non-state group because they easily can blend into a 
country’s population at large. Moreover, trade relationships are almost never established 
between international organizations/states and a rebel group. Therefore, these sanctions 
usually are not targeted at rebel groups because sanctions will not directly affect these 
groups. 
Sanctions will cause economic hardship and strain on the belligerent state, 
resulting in resource depletion. This strain on resources will persuade the state that it can 
no longer continue a war. Hence, we will see the state putting in more effort to reach a 
settlement with the non-state actor. When wars are already long, the decision to continue 
the war is already related to the economic resources available.80 Regan and Aydin’s 
empirical work did find that economic interventions helped reduce duration.81 Similarly, 
Balch-Lindsay found that the greater the domestic costs of a civil war, the shorter the 
war.82 However, these studies were conducted on civil wars. For extra-state wars, 
economic sanctions were not as common which makes case selection difficult. Moreover, 
sanctions are an indirect form of intervention and do not fall into the group of 
interventions being discussed in this paper. Therefore, this research will not test for the 
effect of economic sanctions on duration.  
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Economic support, on the other hand, was widely implemented in extra-state wars 
from 1816 to 2007. Moreover, this form of intervention works very much in the same 
way as military support. Usually, when a country militarily intervenes on behalf of an 
actor in the conflict, economic support is included. The aid or trade benefits an actor 
receives from another party allows it to increase its capabilities and continue fighting the 
conflict. However, economic support does not always directly contribute to military 
capability the way military intervention does. It can come in the form of arms deals 
which is in direct involvement with the conflict and allows non-state actors to continue 
their role in the conflict. On the other hand, economic support can include loans, grants, 
lowering of tariffs etc. These forms of support usually apply to a state actor and help keep 
the state’s economy aloft. Moreover, a state is more likely to take international loans or 
seek such forms of support when it is struggling to continue the conflict. If a state can pad 
its budget in such a way and keep the population’s support for the war, it can most likely 
continue its involvement in the conflict. In other words, economic support on behalf of 
the state actor does not directly increase the capability imbalance between the state and 
non-state actor the same way military support does. It does, however, allow the state to 
continue pursuing the conflict through economic cushioning.83  
 
Hypothesis 5:  Economic support for either side of the conflict will increase duration. 
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Research Design 
 To test the hypotheses outlined above I use a mixed-methods research design. 
First I engage in quantitative analysis to test for the presence of my phenomena, 
correlation between military intervention and war duration. The quantitative analysis also 
provides an overview of trends and the possible effects intervention might have on extra-
state war duration.  
While quantitative analysis is helpful to understanding correlation between 
military interventions and duration, it is unable to illuminate the validity of my proposed 
causal mechanisms. Moreover, due to data constraints, the regression analysis is limited 
to hypotheses related to military interventions, and ignoring the effect of economic and 
diplomatic interventions on war during. 
Hence, I use case studies to complement the findings of my regression analysis. 
Case studies provide a closer look at how intervention may interact with war duration and 
whether this interaction is truly causal or just a correlation. Moreover, if causality can be 
supported, there is also an opportunity to identify causal mechanisms or how intervention 
affects war duration. By just focusing on case studies, I would not be able to generalize to 
the greater population of extra-state wars and there is a possibility of selection bias. 
However, in combination with the regression analysis, the case studies will help get 
closer to understanding the motivations behind some interventions, the mechanisms of 
interventions, and how those mechanisms affect duration.84 
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Case Studies 
 According to Gerring, there are two types of case study approaches: descriptive 
and causal. For the purposes of testing the previously outlined hypotheses and identifying 
causal mechanisms within the relationship between interventions and war duration, I will 
be opting into the causal case study route.  
 Causal case studies aim to understand how the independent variables affects the 
dependent variable. For the purpose of this research, the case studies will be focused on 
how intervention affects extra-state war duration. However, these case studies will not be 
able to identify a precise or numerical effect due to the complexities and multiple 
variables involved in wars. Gerring states that this is acceptable for case studies and 
ultimately, the goal is to discover some working relationship between the variables. 
Moreover, case studies give the opportunity to focus on mechanisms and potential 
confounders, which will be very useful due to limited explanations regression analysis 
can give.85 
 The three main groups of causal case studies are exploratory, estimating, and 
diagnostic. The exploratory group is used in order to identify an independent variable that 
explains the variation in the dependent variable. For our purposes, this is unnecessary 
because intervention is already identified as the independent variable. The two groups of 
case studies which will inform this project’s case selection are estimating and 
diagnostic.86  
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 Estimating case studies aim to test a hypothesis and focus on the independent 
variable. Within the estimating group, longitudinal cases, also known as interrupted time 
series, observes the dependent variable before and after a change occurs in the 
independent variable, while holding controls constant.87 
 Diagnostic cases are used to confirm/reject/refine hypotheses that have already 
been tested. In other words, diagnostic cases are very useful in identifying causal 
mechanisms, which confirm and explain hypotheses. Within Diagnostic cases, pathway 
cases indicate a strong relationship between the variables and hence make it viable to 
identify causal mechanisms.88 
 To test hypothesis 3, whether an equitable distribution of military interventions 
will increase duration, the Western Sahara War will be studied. This case falls in the 
Diagnostic Pathway group. This is the only extra-state conflict with military interventions 
on behalf of the state and the non-state actor. In other words, this case would be the only 
opportunity to see the effect of two-sided military interventions on war duration. This war 
lasted almost 98 months, while the average for all extra-state wars is about 26 months. 
Hence, there is a strong positive correlation between the interventions and duration. This 
case will be complex because of the multiple interventions, but it will also provide plenty 
of opportunities to assess causal mechanisms of intervention on duration. Moreover, this 
case can help elucidate the potential differences in how intervention affects duration 
depending on which side of the conflict it takes place on.  
                                               
87 Ibid., 69-71. 
88 Ibid., 72-81. 
34 
 
  For hypothesis 4, I will analyze the Cisplatine War, which had diplomatic 
intervention, but no military or economic intervention. This case falls in the Estimating 
Longitudinal group because it is attempting to test the relationship between the 
independent and dependent variable without any previous quantitative analysis. 
Moreover, this case heavily focuses on the independent variable (diplomatic intervention) 
and isolates it from other types of intervention. By isolating the independent variable, this 
case will also provide opportunities to identify causal mechanisms.  
Lastly, the Mozambique War will be used to test hypothesis 5. This war had 
economic intervention, but no military or diplomatic intervention. This case is also an 
Estimating Longitudinal case because the hypothesis has not been previously tested and 
the case was chosen based on the independent variable.  Again, by isolating economic 
intervention, this case will help us understand how economic intervention effects 
duration.  
These three cases will not singlehandedly prove their respective hypotheses. 
However, they will contribute to our understanding of how these different types of 
intervention potentially play a causal role in the duration of the conflict. This case study 
analysis is more geared towards isolating the various causal mechanisms of intervention 
in order to support or detract from the findings of the regression analysis.  
 
Regression Analysis 
     To test my hypotheses I conduct an Ordinary Least Squares Regression analysis. 
An OLS regression will provide data on how intervention and duration are correlated. If 
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that analysis proves a statistically significant correlation, I can take the next step by 
identifying potential causal mechanisms through case studies.  
 
Operationalization of Variables 
    The Correlates of War dataset on extra-state wars ranges from 1816 to 2007. Duration 
is defined as how long a war lasts. For this project and based on the specificity of the 
Correlates of War data, duration will be defined in months. There were many instances 
where the war could have been measured by days, but due to the numerous cases where 
only the months were available, this research will focus on months. 
Military intervention will be included as a nominal-level set for how many 
interventions occurred. According to Correlates of War, “to be coded as a participant, a 
state must either commit 1000 troops to operations in the combat zone or suffer 100 
battle-deaths in the course of such operations.” Most cases of military interventions will 
either be coded 0 for no intervention or 1 for the presence of interventions. The 
interventions will then be divided by which side they were on behalf of: the state or non-
state actor. Moreover, the timing of the intervention will be split into three groups: within 
the first year, after the first year, and after five years of the conflict. In addition, the 
interventions will be divided based on whether they were part of a coalition (like the 
invasion of Afghanistan) or a unilateral decision (like the French intervention in the 
Moroccan Rif war). 
Controls will include  
1) War Type: colonial war or imperial war 
2) Number of state battle deaths 
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3) Number of non-state battle deaths 
4) Who initiated the conflict 
a) the state actor  
b) the non-state actor 
5) Outcome 
a) state win 
b) non-state win 
c) compromise 
d) the war transformed into another type of war 
e) the war is ongoing as of 12/31/2007 
f) Stalemate 
g) conflict continues at below war level,  
6) Region 
a) Western Hemisphere 
b) Europe 
c) Africa 
d) Middle East 
e) Asia 
f) Oceanie 
7) If the extra-state war was transformed from another type of war (intrastate 
or interstate) 
8) If the extra-state war transformed into another type of war (intrastate or 
interstate) 
  
These controls aim to isolate potential alternative explanations for duration. 
Colonial and imperial wars are fundamentally different because they occur for different 
reasons. In colonial wars, the state is on the defensive while in imperial wars, the state 
can take either the defensive or offensive position. On average, a colonial war lasts about 
a year longer than an imperial war, supporting the idea that these wars have fundamental 
differences which can contribute to duration. By controlling for the type of war, the effect 
of intervention on duration can be further isolated. 
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The number of state and non-state battle deaths are indicators of the intensity of 
the conflict and can help control for how war intensity effects duration. Moreover, wars 
may differ in duration depending on who initiated the conflict and whether the state must 
initially take the offensive or defensive position. In addition, the controlling of the 
outcome of the conflict helps explain whether stalemates and continuing low-intensity 
conflict significantly contribute to duration. Similarly, identifying whether a war 
transformed into another type of war or transformed from another type of war plays a 
similar role in ruling out other explainers of duration. Lastly, controlling for region 
attempts to isolate whether some regions/countries produce longer/shorter wars. 
 To test the robustness of the overall OLS regression, I conduct regressions on 
more specific aspects of intervention. First, I conduct a multivariate regression for 
interventions on the side of the state, as well as on the side of the non-state actor. These 
regressions will either support or take away from the overall regression analysis, while 
also lending some data to test my first two hypotheses.  There is one case where military 
intervention took place on both sides of the conflict. This case will be included in both 
the intervention (state) and intervention (non-state) groups.  
Interventions occur with different motivations and interests. Some states hope to 
see a conflict come to an end and choose to intervene for that reason. Other states use 
intervention to continue the conflict in hope that the involved countries will be weakened. 
Through quantitative analysis, it is very difficult to understand the motivations/interests 
driving an intervention, and therefore difficult to assess the intended effect and 
mechanism of the intervention. 
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     In order to partially account for the wide spectrum of motivations involved with 
interventions, the cases will be divided based on timing of the intervention. Intervention 
will be divided into three groups: within the first year, after the first year, and after the 
first five years. Although the exact reasoning behind each intervention cannot be clearly 
delineated, an intervention within the first six months of a conflict and an intervention 
after five years of a conflict might have different characteristics whether it has to do with 
motivation, interests, goals, military power, or economic prosperity. If not, these 
regressions will produce equal results.  
     Using this classification, I will conduct another set of regressions testing how 
these different intervention timings effect duration. It is important to note that these 
groups of intervention timing will not be compared to each other, but rather, they would 
be compared to the overall regression conducted at the start of this analysis to see if there 
are any conflicting results. It would not make sense to compare these groups to each other 
because wars that attract intervention after five years and wars that attract intervention 
within six months are not comparable samples of the larger population of extra-state 
conflicts. In essence, there are too many unobserved variables that make these types of 
wars too different for comparison. 
     To finish off this robustness check, a last regression will be conducted dividing 
intervention into a coalition group and a non-coalition group. Coalitions occurs when a 
state enters into a war with supporters already contributing to its side. For example, the 
United States, and the United Kingdom launched Operation Enduring Freedom (invasion 
of Afghanistan) together in 2001 and were later joined by Australia, Canada, and 
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Germany. The U.S. and UK would be considered a coalition since they started the 
conflict together, while the later support from other countries would fall under non-
coalition interventions. In the overall regression, coalitions and non-coalitions are not 
distinguished as different types of intervention. This is because in the few cases of 
coalition conflicts, there is usually one state that leads the conflict, with the others 
providing military support. In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. was leading the operation 
with British assistance. However, to check the robustness of this design choice, a 
regression separating coalitions and non-coalition interventions will be necessary. 
     As mentioned before, all of these regressions will have the same controls. These 
controls will be whether the war was colonial or imperial, state battle deaths, non-state 
battle deaths, initiator, outcome, region, and whether the extra-state war was transformed 
from another type of war. 
 
Constraints 
     Interventions are not random, creating an issue of omitted variable bias. The type 
of conflict that attracts an intervention, regardless of whether that intervention was 
military, economic, or diplomatic, may involve another variable that is actually the factor 
behind the duration of the conflict. This makes it extremely difficult to isolate 
intervention as a causal factor explaining war duration.  In essence, this omitted variable 
bias occurs because I am unable to know why countries intervene, what characteristics of 
a conflict attract that intervention, and why these countries intervene when they do. 
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     Data-wise, I do not have access to economic or diplomatic interventions. My data 
on extra-state wars runs from 1816 to 2007, stating only whether a military intervention 
occurred. In some situations, states do not reveal that they economically supported a 
party in an extra-state conflict due to fear of international repercussions. These “secret” 
interventions make it very difficult to categorize all the military interventions and keep 
them separate from possible economic/military support that might have been occurring 
covertly. 
     Moreover, I do not have data describing the intensity of the intervention. This 
includes data on the number of troops committed, number of weapons given, amount of 
aid, training etc. Even if this data was accessible, its accuracy could be debated since 
many states do not reveal the extent of their intervention. For example, in Syria today, 
Iran is unwilling to fully disclose the amount of aid and the number of troops it sends on 
behalf of Assad. 
     Another categorization issue comes up with coalitions. Some extra-state wars are 
fought between a coalition of states and a non-state actor. For example, the invasion of 
Afghanistan consisted of a coalition of states attacking Al-Qaeda. Usually, a coalition is 
headed by a single state. In the case of Afghanistan, the U.S. was the prime member of 
the coalition. The question then becomes whether to count this coalition war as a non-
intervention war or count the other members of the coalition as interveners. For the 
purposes of this research, coalitions are considered as cases of intervention. However, the 
regression analysis will include the control of whether the interventions were coalitions 
or not.  
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On top of that, mixed wars are difficult to place under a single type of war. The 
Syrian Civil War is an intrastate war, an extra-state war, and arguable a proxy interstate 
war. Categorizing a situation like Syria becomes confusing and could muddle the data. 
     Although these constraints are extensive, other studies, including published ones, 
have these same constraints. Just because this research topic will not yield “perfect” and a 
completely sound research design, does not mean it is not worth studying. I understand 
that these constraints exist and make it difficult to isolate intervention as a causal factor 
in war duration. However, going forward with this research helps us understand a little 
more how intervention and war duration interact. More importantly, this design will 
begin a much-needed debate and discussion on extra-state wars and possibly variables 
that are important to explaining duration. 
 
Results 
 Before conducting the OLS regression analysis on the military interventions in 
extra-state wars, a survey of the descriptive statistics of these cases is necessary. As 
illustrated by Table 1, there were 162 cases of extra-state wars since 1816. The duration, 
measured in months, averaged around 26 months with the shortest war lasting four days 
(Allied bombardment of Algiers) and the longest war lasting nearly 14 years (Angolan-
Portuguese war). There were 17 cases of military intervention, with 15 interventions on 
behalf of the state and 3 interventions on behalf of the non-state actor. In those cases, 1 
conflict did have both a state and non-state-side intervention (Western Sahara war). 
 In regards to timing, 12 of the interventions took place within the first year of the 
conflict, while 5 took place after the first year. There were no interventions that took 
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place after five years of an ongoing conflict. Similarly, 12 of the interventions involved 
coalitions, while 5 did not. 
Table 1: Number of Observations and Averages of Variables 
 
 
Table 2 shows the results of the regression analysis. Model 1 tests the correlation 
between the occurrence of military intervention and war duration. The regression reveals 
that extra-state wars with military intervention are, on average, 24 months longer than 
wars without military intervention. The control variables that do correlate to war duration 
 Observations Range (min-max) Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Duration 
(months) 
 
162 
 
0.167-166.733 
 
25.9 
 
33.677 
Military 
Intervention 
17 interventions 0: No intervention 
1: Intervention 
0.105 0.307 
State side 15 state-side 
interventions 
0: No state side 
intervention 
1: State side intervention 
0.093 0.291 
Non-State side 3 non-state side 
interventions 
0: No non-state side 
intervention 
1: Non-state side 
intervention 
0.019 0.135 
Timing 17 interventions 0: No intervention 
1: Within the first year 
2: After the first year 
3: After five years 
0.136 0.425 
Coalition 5 coalitions 0: No intervention 
1: Intervention without 
coalition 
2: Intervention with 
coalition 
0.136 0.425 
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are the type of war, whether the conflict transformed from another type of war, the 
number of state-side battle deaths, and the number of non-state-side battle deaths. 
Model 2 was testing to see whether only interventions on behalf of the state 
correlated with war duration. Similar to model 1, model 2 shows that wars with state-side 
intervention are on average 22 months longer than wars without state-side intervention. 
For this model, the only controls that were statistically significant were the type of war 
and battle deaths for both sides of the conflict. Hypothesis 2 stated that war duration will 
decrease if there is intervention on behalf of the state. This hypothesis was not supported 
by model 2’s findings. 
Model 3 focused on wars with intervention on behalf of the non-state actor. There 
were only 3 cases with such type of intervention. These cases were, on average, almost 
54 months longer than wars without non-state-side intervention. This model does support 
hypothesis 3, which stated that war duration would increase with intervention on behalf 
of the non-state actor. 
Model 4 looks at the differences involved with intervention timing. According to 
this regression, wars that had an intervention within the first year of the conflict were on 
average 17 months longer than wars without any intervention. Moreover, wars that had 
an intervention after the first year were about 34 months longer than wars without 
interventions and 17 months longer than wars that had an intervention within the first 
year.  Lastly, model 5 looks at the duration of conflicts with coalition interventions and 
non-coalition interventions. Wars with a non-coalition intervention were, on average 
almost 15 months longer than wars without any intervention. In addition, wars with 
coalition interventions were about 29 months longer than wars without any intervention 
and about 15 months longer than wars that had a non-coalition intervention. 
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Table 2: Ordinary Least Squares Regression:  Extra-state War Duration and Intervention 
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l  : rdinary Least Squares Regr ssion: Extra-state W r Dur tion and I tervention 
 
 Duration (months) 
 Model 1 Model 
2 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Military Intervention 24.041** 
(3.03) 
- - - - 
State side 
 
- 22.120* 
(2.57) 
- - - 
Non-State side - - 53.674** 
(2.87) 
- - 
Timing - - - 16.837** 
(2.96) 
- 
 Coalition  - - - - 14.616* 
(2.55) 
War Type (Colonial or Imperial) -11.058* 
(-2.04) 
-10.925* 
(-2.00) 
-12.600* 
(-2.31) 
-11.064* 
(-2.04) 
-10.630 
(-1.94) 
Initiator (State or Non-State) 0.706 
(0.14) 
1.471 
(0.28) 
0.284 
(0.06) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
-0.167 
(-0.03) 
Outcome of the Conflict 1.932 
(1.13) 
2.032 
(1.18) 
1.767 
(1.03) 
2.326 
(1.38) 
2.054 
(1.19) 
Transformed from another type of 
war 
29.310* 
(2.26) 
26.316 
(1.95) 
47.591*** 
(3.62) 
31.694* 
(2.47) 
35.410** 
(2.77) 
Transformed to another type of war 8.310 
(0.74) 
14.451 
(1.26) 
-1.649 
(-0.14) 
5.661 
(0.50) 
5.897 
(0.51) 
Region of the conflict 0.086 
(0.07) 
0.0115 
(0.09) 
0.468 
(0.39) 
0.144 
(0.12) 
0.145 
(0.12) 
State Battle Deaths .0005** 
(2.49) 
.0005* 
(2.39) 
.0006** 
(3.01) 
.0005* 
(2.51) 
.0005* 
(2.51) 
Non-state Battle Deaths .0003* 
(2.18) 
.0003* 
(2.19) 
.0002 
(1.85) 
.0003* 
(2.16) 
.0003* 
(2.15) 
Constant 19.625* 
(2.54) 
19.135* 
(2.46) 
20.237* 
(2.61) 
19.271* 
(2.50) 
19.650* 
(2.52) 
Observations 162 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
 * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Figure 1 illustrates the differences in duration between intervening on behalf of 
the state and on behalf of the non-state actor. The data does support the hypothesis stating 
that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor will correlate to higher duration 
(hypothesis 1). However, this same data does not support the hypothesis stating that 
military intervention will correlate to lower durations (hypothesis 2). Figure 1 shows that 
intervention correlates to higher durations more when the intervention was on behalf of 
the non-state actor. However, the overall intervention-duration regression line seems to 
be closely aligned to the state-side intervention regression line. This might be attributed 
to the fact that a large majority of all the interventions were on behalf of the state actor.  
 Although this graph detracts from the strength of hypothesis 2, it does support the 
theory forming the basis of the first two hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 and 2 were based on 
the idea that the non-state actor and state actor have a large capacity gap. In essence, the 
state actor is most probably in the advantaged situation. Hence, if a state actor receives 
military support, the capacity gap widens, allowing for the state to defeat the non-state 
actor quicker. However, if the non-state actor receives military support, the capacity gap 
closes, leveling the playing field and protracting the conflict. 
 Figure 1 shows that military intervention on behalf of the non-state actor 
correlates to higher durations than interventions on the state-side. In other words, an 
increase in military support for the non-state actor allows them to close the capacity gap 
enough to continue the conflict. This effect rings true for interventions on behalf of the 
state as well, but not to the same degree. The case studies in the second half of this paper 
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will help illuminate how the effects of interventions may differ based on which side they 
are on behalf of. 
Figure 1: Extra-state War Duration by Interventions on Behalf of the State and Non-State Actor 
Overall, these regressions show a strong positive correlation between 
interventions and extra-state war duration. However, the issue of omitted variable bias 
has not disappeared. For example, model 3 showed that conflicts with interventions on 
behalf of the non-state actor are almost 54 months longer than conflicts without that type 
of intervention. It could be that conflicts that happen to attract intervention on the side of 
the non-state actor have another characteristic or driving variable that elongates the war. 
Although this problem still exists, the regression analysis does tell us that conflicts with 
intervention last much longer than conflicts without. This regression analysis has not 
proved that intervention is the causal link between the varying degrees of duration. 
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However, it does give us some insight into how extra-state conflicts can be 
characteristically different and that intervention interacts with these characteristics. To 
understand how intervention interacts with these difference and to test hypotheses 3, 4, 
and 5, a case study analysis will be conducted.  
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The Western Sahara War: 1975-1983 [1991] 
 The Western Sahara War took place between mainly Morocco and the Polisario 
Front, who claimed self-determination, from 1975 to 1983, outside of Morocco’s 
internationally recognized borders. For the next eight years the conflict continued at low-
level intensity until a ceasefire was signed in 1991.  
This conflict involves all three types of intervention. Mauritania entered the war 
with Morocco as a coalition, providing military support. Although this was a coalition, 
Mauritania played a minor role compared to Morocco, which is why this conflict is 
usually framed between Morocco and the Polisario. Moreover, the United States, Saudi 
Arabia, and France provided varying levels of economic support to Morocco. In addition, 
France provided limited military intervention through an aerial bombing campaign. The 
Polisario received economic support from Libya and Algeria. Algeria played a much 
larger role and even engaged in military combat in the beginning of the conflict. Lastly, 
although the conflict was no longer considered a war by 1991, a UN-sponsored ceasefire 
(diplomatic intervention) is what ended the conflict. However, the actual “war” ended in 
1983 merely out of a decrease in operational activities and battle deaths. 
 Given that the Western Sahara War is characterized by military interventions on 
both sides, I am able to test hypothesis 3: if there is an equitable distribution of third party 
military interventions, war duration will increase. In addition, there are instances of 
economic intervention on both sides.89 In many conflicts, different types of interventions 
                                               
89 Although multiple occurrences of intervention may complicate the causal effect between one type of 
intervention and duration, many conflicts have the same issue. If we are to look for external validity and 
apply some of the identified mechanisms to other cases, the case cannot be purely unique. 
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overlap and interact with each other. Since this conflict has a high correlation between 
intervention and duration, the purpose of using this case is not necessarily just to identify 
whether intervention increases/decreases duration. Rather, this case provides ample 
opportunity to identify how military or economic intervention affects duration and 
through which mechanisms. Hence, it falls under the Diagnostic Pathway case group.90 
 In sum, this case is looking to understand whether and how military and economic 
interventions increase war duration. I hypothesize that the interventions gave both sides 
the means to fight whether it be through weapons or economic support, prolonging the 
conflict. According to Weisiger, Vasquez, Bennett and Stam, without additional 
resources, both sides would reach their breaking point sooner where the costs of the war 
would outweigh the benefits.91 Hence, when both sides receive military aid, they feel less 
need to compromise and continue fighting until a stalemate.  
 
Historical Overview 
 Morocco is a northwestern African country that achieved independence from 
French (and somewhat Spanish) control in 1956. The territory of Western Sahara was 
under Spanish control until 1975, when Spain handed control to Morocco and Mauritania. 
The Sahrawi people of Western Sahara developed a sense of identity and nationalism for 
                                               
90 John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices¸ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017). 
91 Alex Weisiger, “Learning from the Battlefield: Information, Domestic Politics, and Interstate War 
Duration,” International Organization 70, no. 2 (2016). 
 John Vasquez, The War Puzzle, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 183. 
Scott Bennett and Allan Stam, “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: A Combined Model of War 
Outcomes and Duration,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 3 (1998). 
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a few decades prior to this transfer and by 1973, created the Frente Popular para la 
Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (the Polisario Front) in order to stake a 
claim for self-determination. 
Morocco was split into a French and Spanish protectorate from 1912 to 1956. In 
1956, Morocco achieved independence from France. However, Spain had a claim on the 
Western Sahara since the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. By the mid-20th century, 
Spain established Spanish West Africa which was composed Ifni, Saqiya al Hamra, and 
Rio de Oro. In 1958, Spain gave the Tarfaya Strip and later in 1969, gave the Ifni region 
to Morocco in return for fishing privileges. The Sahrawi people of this region were key 
players in Morocco’s anticolonial movement through the creation of the Sahrawi 
Liberation Army, which attacked Spanish and French outposts.  
 Although Morocco was independent, the Western Sahara was still considered 
Spanish Sahara. The Sahrawi people, through decades of resisting colonial powers and 
forming coalitions, began to see themselves as a separate ethnic group with nationalist 
goals. In 1971, El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, with other nationalists, started what would 
become the Polisario Front by 1973. This group called for armed struggle to resist the 
Spanish and potentially create a state separate from Morocco or Mauritania. On October 
15, 1975, the UN Mission to Spanish Sahara came out in favor of Western Saharan self-
determination. One day later, the International Court of Justice issued a ruling against 
Morocco claiming the Western Sahara. In response, Hassan II of Morocco made plans for 
the “Green March” on the same day as the ICJ ruling. The Green March culminated on 
November 6, 1975 where about 350,000 unarmed Moroccans made their way over to the 
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Western Sahara on foot in order to claim it for Morocco. After Spain decided to negotiate 
on the matter of the Western Sahara, Hassan II ordered the volunteers to reenter 
Morocco.  
 On November 14, 1975, Spain, Morocco and Mauritania signed the Madrid 
Accords which would divide the Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania. As 
Spain prepared to withdraw, the Polisario began attacking Moroccan and Mauritanian 
forces, beginning the Western Sahara War on December 11, 1975. The Polisario Front 
utilized their knowledge of the terrain and guerilla tactics to throw both Moroccan and 
Mauritanian forces off. However, due to the war, many Sahrawis fled to neighboring 
Algeria.  
 By February of 1976, the Polisario Front created the Sahrawi Arab Democratic 
Republic (SADR). The Polisario focused on attacking Mauritanian forces at the start of 
the conflict, knowing that they were the weaker component of the coalition. Soon 
enough, the effective guerilla tactics on supply lines and military bases forced Mauritania 
to withdraw and eventually recognize the SADR in 1979. Morocco responded by starting 
the “Berm” initiative which consisted of building large walls around Polisario-dominated 
regions from 1981 to 1987. The decrease in war intensity is somewhat contributed to the 
Berm, as well as to Morocco’s strained economy. In September of 1991, both parties 
agreed to a UN ceasefire which called for a referendum on the future of Western Sahara. 
52 
 
However, that referendum is still in discussion mainly due to a disagreement on voter 
eligibility.92 
 
Interventions on Behalf of the Polisario Front 
 Although Algeria was the main supporter of the Polisario, it was not the first. 
Starting in 1973, Libya was the sole economic supporter of the Polisario. Using profits 
from its oil resources, Libya contributed weapons, training, and even broadcasting 
capabilities.93 However, any weapons it sent had to go through Algeria and needed 
Algerian permission.94 Therefore, the Polisario did receive limited support from Algeria, 
although their weapons were exclusively Libyan from 1973 to 1975.95 Libya continued to 
offer its economic support up until 1984 when it signed the Treaty of Oujda with 
Morocco.96 This treaty arose out of Gaddafi’s fears of a balkanized Maghreb and an 
increase in regional issues.  
 At the start of the conflict, Algeria was more concerned with maintaining its 
détente with Morocco than it was with promoting self-determination in Western Sahara. 
In the mid-1970s, El Ouali, founder of the Polisario, approached many countries, 
                                               
92 “War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara,” Strategic Studies Institute, last modified May 2013, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1152.pdf. 
93 Toby Shelley, Endgame in the Western Sahara: What Future for Africa’s Last Colony, (London: Zed 
Books, 2004), 194.   
Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Western Saharans, (New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1980), 
259. 
94 Tony Hodges, Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War, (New York: Lawrence Hill Books, 1984), 
326. 
95 Oyvind Osterud, “War Termination in the Western Sahara,” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 20, no. 3 
(1989). 
96 Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 23. 
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requesting aid for their cause. He was rejected by most countries, including Algeria.97 In 
the Arab League Summit in Rabat in 1974, Boumedienne even gave his blessing to the 
Moroccan goals in Western Sahara and promised not to oppose the occupation.98 
However, the release of the UN and ICJ opinions on Western Sahara’s right to self-
determination along with Morocco’s Green March shifted Algeria’s outlook. 
Boumedienne became horrified by the lack of self-determination, Morocco’s perpetual 
thirst for expansion, and the potential of using profits from the phosphate found in the 
Western Sahara to fund weapons research. Even then, Algeria was unsure on how 
organized and effective the Sahrawi people were.99 
 Algeria watched as the Polisario executed small but successful guerilla attacks 
against the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces. Their ability to rally support amongst their 
people and organize effective military strategies impressed Algerian officials.100 The 
UN/ICJ rulings on self-determination, Polisario’s effectiveness, and the potential of 
getting access to an Atlantic trading port all contributed to Algeria’s decision to militarily 
and economically support the Polisario.101 The Polisario rose to a new level of militancy 
after receiving Algerian support.102 They began to receive recoilless artillery, 14.5 mm 
ZPU anti-aircraft machine guns, 120 mm mortars, multiple rocket launchers, SAM 7 
                                               
97 Suresh Saxena, Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 
1995), 118. 
98 Phillip Naylor, “Spain and France and the Decolonization of Western Sahara: Parity and Paradoxes, 
1975-87,” Africa Today 34, no. 3 (1987). 
99 Suresh Saxena, Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 
1995), 121. 
100 Ibid., 122. 
101 Phillip Naylor, “Spain and France and the Decolonization of Western Sahara: Parity and Paradoxes, 
1975-87,” Africa Today 34, no. 3 (1987). 
102 Suresh Saxena, Western Sahara: No Alternative to Armed Struggle, (New Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 
1995), 124. 
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portable missile launchers, rocket-propelled grenades, T55 tanks, SAM 6 missile systems, 
armored troop carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and reconnaissance vehicles.103 With 
these weapons at hand, the Polisario could now wage a proper war of attrition against the 
Moroccans. Coupled with their pre-existing knowledge of the terrain and extensive use of 
guerilla tactics, the Polisario became a real threat to the Moroccan military.104 
 Moreover, Algeria accepted and supported the thousands of Sahrawi refugees in 
the Tindouf and other camps. In fact, almost one half of the native population has lived as 
refugees in Algeria since 1976.105 It is estimated that Algeria spent $50,000 a day 
supporting refugees in the late 1970s alone.106 In addition, refugee camps such as the one 
in Tindouf served as training and recruitment sanctuaries for Polisario fighters. Most of 
the missile and anti-aircraft training took place in these camps.107 On top of that, Algeria 
provided the Polisario with a radio station called, “Voice of Free Sahara” to rally support 
and recruit.108 
 Interestingly, Algeria’s military intervention was very limited and only took place 
at the start of the conflict.109 On January 27, 1976, Moroccan troops attacked armed 
Algerian troops in Amgala, Western Sahara (but close to the Algerian border). These 
Algerian troops claimed they were stationed there to help with the stream of refugees 
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coming in. The Battle of Amgala ensued for 36 hours with about 400 Moroccan deaths 
and 200 Algerian deaths. The Algerian troops retreated, but with tensions high, fighting 
resumed in February of 1976 for two days.110 Although Algeria did not contribute troops 
to the conflict after these two instances, the military intervention did highlight its 
motivations for involving itself in the war. In the battles of Amgala, Algeria witnessed 
Morocco’s refusal for Sahrawi self-determination and its lust for territorial expansion. 
Having been initially attacked by Moroccan troops, Algeria could not end its support for 
the Polisario after investing so much. Moreover, Polisario success against the Moroccan 
troops only strengthened Algeria’s resolve in continuing to support the guerilla group.111  
 
Polisario Capabilities Before and After 
 Prior to both Libyan and Algerian support, the Polisario was a disorganized band 
of Sahrawi nationalists. In 1975, the Polisario was composed of about 800 men with very 
few weapons.112 They were confined to a small tract of land from Guelta to the Algerian 
border, making it easier for Moroccan aircrafts to track them.113 During the time that they 
were poorly equipped, most reports did not see a real match between Morocco and the 
Polisario. The war was not predicted to last long because of the severe capability 
differences between the two actors.114 The Polisario understood this early on and began 
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an intensive public relations campaign where they would invite delegations and 
journalists in hopes of reaching international ears, while also garnering recruitment.115 
With help from Libya’s broadcasting channels and Algeria’s radio station, the Polisario 
grew from 800 men in 1975 to 10,000 men in 1977 and to almost 20,000 men in 1981.116 
In essence, Libya’s and Algeria’s support helped transform the Polisario into an almost 
conventional army with a couple years. By the mid-1980s, the Polisario had about 100 
tanks, 60 carriers, and 100 artillery units.117 
 What is interesting to note is that by 1979, Morocco began relying on air power to 
track and attack Polisario units. Normally, on such a small area of land, this would prove 
to be destructive. Even though the Polisario mostly operated at night, the Moroccan 
military had advanced infrared technology. However, the Polisario received SAM 7 
missiles and anti-aircraft training from the Algerian military. Through effective use of the 
training and technology, the Polisario were able to evade many of Morocco’s air 
attacks.118 Ultimately, Algerian and somewhat Libyan support helped build the Polisario 
from a small guerilla group into an effective and successful military. 
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Interventions on Behalf of Morocco 
 Mauritania holds a very interesting position within the Western Sahara conflict. 
On one hand, it entered the war in a coalition with Morocco. However, being a much 
weaker ally, Mauritania is never considered a major belligerent in the war. In fact, it only 
took a part in the conflict from 1976 to 1979. Even though Mauritania entered the conflict 
alongside Morocco, it is considered a military intervener because of its limited role in the 
conflict.  
 On November 14, 1975, representatives from Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania 
signed the Pact of Madrid. This agreement divided the Western Sahara territory between 
its neighbors: Morocco and Mauritania. Hence, as Spain withdrew and the war began, 
Mauritania found itself forced to work with Morocco in protecting one of the few assets it 
possessed. However, Mauritania’s resources and military were much smaller than those 
of Morocco.119 In 1976, Mauritania’s army consisted of about 5,000 troops.120 In 
comparison, Morocco’s starting military size ranged from 60,000 to 80,000 troops. In 
essence, Mauritania, limited by its own capabilities, was only able to commit very few 
human and material resources. 
 The Polisario quickly realized they were fighting a two-front war and strategized 
accordingly. Recognizing the drastic military difference between their adversaries, the 
Polisario refocused its attacks on Mauritania. The ultimate goal was to attack and weaken 
Mauritania’s government to the point that they would back out of the conflict and seek 
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peace purely for survival. This would allow the Polisario to concentrate their forces on 
Morocco. In July of 1976, the Polisario crossed the border into Mauritania and shelled the 
suburbs of the capital, Nouakchott. Then, in May of 1977, the Polisario attacked the 
mining city of Zouerate, taking six French hostages. Within two months, they re-attacked 
Nouakchott. By 1977, Mauritania causalities included 1,600 deaths, 900 wounded, and 16 
prisoners. The costs of war took up about 40% of Mauritania’s state budget in 1977, 
eventually going up to 60% in 1978. Due to the hostage situation, foreign workers began 
leaving the country, halting the iron industry and weakening the economy even further.  
 Apart from financial assistance from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Ivory Coast, 
Mauritania mostly received aid from France. France’s historical and economic ties to 
Mauritania, compounded by the hostage situation brought on a short French intervention. 
121 The Franco-Mauritanian military agreement resulted I extensive French aid to its 
former colony. Using their base in Dakar, Senegal, France conducted Jaguar air strikes 
against ahrawi columns in Mauritania from December 1977 to July 1978.122 On top of 
that, France’s aid boosted Mauritania’s military from 5,000 troops in 1976 to about 
17,000 troops in 1978.123 Moreover, Mauritania received about 50 tanks,a erial surveys, 
paratrooper missions, and the eventual Jaguar strikes on small Western Saharan towns 
like Oum Dreyga.124 
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 However, the economic burden coupled with the extensive drought made the 
government quite unpopular with the Mauritanian people. In 1977, there were number 
cabinet changes, eventually leading to a July 1978 coup and ousting of President 
Daddah.125 By the time of the coup, the French already realized Mauritania’s dwindling 
chances against the Polisario and succeeded in evacuating all foreign French workers 
from Mauritania. Hence, France’s intervention came to an abrupt end.126 The new 
Mauritanian regime quickly realized the country’s weakened state and withdrew its 
forces from the conflict in 1979. Soon after, Mauritania signed a peace agreement with 
the Polisario on August 5, 1979. Morocco did not hesitate to claim the former 
Mauritanian land.127  
 Although Mauritanian intervention was limited, it brought in a powerful ally for 
the Moroccans: the French. France continued to support Morocco through the conflict. 
Throughout the war, Morocco received about $2 billion in weapons from France, with 
only half of them being purchases. These weapons included jets, missiles, helicopters, 
gunships, and intelligence-gathering technologies.128 Other countries that provided 
weapons and aid include Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Libya, Iraq, South Africa, Belgium, Italy, 
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Spain, and Brazil. However, compared to the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, these countries were 
minor contributors to Moroccan military capabilities.129 
 Morocco had been receiving aid from the U.S. from the last year of the Carter 
administration to the early 1980s, when the conflict began to stabilize.130 Interestingly, 
Moroccan failure to quickly subdue the Polisario prompted the U.S. (as well as Saudi 
Arabia and France) to support Morocco. From 1976 to 1984, the U.S. spent, on average 
$1 million a year just training Moroccan officers, pilots, and counterinsurgency (COIN) 
specialists. Moreover, by 1982, there were about 100 U.S. advisors in Morocco training 
Moroccan troops on US bases on missile countermeasures and evasion.131 On top of that, 
the U.S. provided about $140-$150 million a year in loans and grants.132  
 In terms of weapons, the U.S. sold about $150 million in arms in 1980 itself. 
These weapons included F-5s, armored vehicles, cluster bomb units, and anti-tank 
weapons.133 Specifically, the U.S. helped Morocco install a Forward Area Altering Radar 
system in February of 1980, allowing for detection of troop and armor movements.134 
Moreover, Morocco received about $750 million in Foreign Military Sales and $150 
million in Commercial Sales. About one-fourth of all Moroccan military purchases came 
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from the U.S.135 In terms of training, the U.S trained over 1500 troops in exchange for 
$17 million, while also providing electronic surveillance and radar to coordinate strikes. 
On top of that, the U.S. provided $475 million in credits and almost $200 million in 
grants.136 There was even some suspicion of a Green Berets clandestine operation from 
1982 to 1983.137 
 As the Moroccan economy turned for the worse in the mid-1980s with a two year 
drought, budget limitations, costs of war, world recession, and inflation, the U.S. found 
ways to keep their economy afloat.138 By 1983, Morocco was $11 billion in debt. In the 
early 1980s, the IMF issued the largest rescue operation in the third world. It provided $1 
billion in standby credit as requested by President Reagan. In addition, the U.S. increased 
its Foreign Military Sales Credits to $100 million in 1982 in the hopes that Morocco 
would get closer to winning the war.139 Moreover, due to the ongoing conflict, many 
foreign investors became weary of putting capital into Morocco’s phosphate industry. 
Soon enough, U.S. investors began supporting phosphate mining.140 
 Saudi Arabia also provided a major support system for the Moroccan economy. In 
1979, when Morocco’s war costs exceeded 40% of its state budget, Saudi Arabia began 
its economic aid to ease the burden.141 Throughout the war, Saudi Arabia gave about $1 
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billion a year in aid to Morocco.142 Saudi Arabia’s reasoning was similar to that of the 
U.S. It saw a weakening Morocco succumbing to a guerilla non-state actor. 
 Ultimately, Morocco’s inability to quickly defeat the Polisario opened the door 
for foreign economic interventions. In summary, the U.S. provided material goods, the 
French issued training and intelligence, and the Saudis heavily financed the Moroccan 
military.143  
 
Moroccan Capabilities: Before and After 
 In 1975, the Moroccan army consisted of 60,000 troops. However, by just 1978, 
this size went over 80,000 troops, 61 combat planes, armored tanks, and helicopters.144 In 
1979, the army consisted of 120,000 troops. In 1978, the military budget was $760 
million.145 In the initial onset of the conflict, Morocco quickly took over all Western 
Saharan settlements and outposts, hoping to remove any form of cover available to the 
Polisario. Although there was initial success in disorganizing the Polisario, the guerilla 
group quickly regrouped and strategized. Soon enough, the Polisario used their anti-
missile technology (from Algeria and Libya) to shoot down Moroccan planes. On top of 
that, their knowledge of the terrain made it extremely difficult for Moroccan troops to 
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locate and disband them.146 The Moroccan military had to refocus on defense 
fortifications.147 
Due to the weapons technology Morocco received, the U.S. ambassador to 
Morocco and the Institute for Straegic Studies both predicted that the desert terrain would 
allow for a rapid COIN campaign. In other words, Morocco would easily be able to 
defeat and disband the Polisario.148 This prediction was not unsupported. Morocco had a 
larger military, more advanced weapons, and richer foreign supporters.149 However, 
Western Saharan terrain was actually amenable to guerilla activities due to good cover 
and areas for small bases. Moroccan COIN became extremely ineffective. Even with 
infrared technology given by the U.S. and France, the issues of poor training, particle 
haze, and not being able to cover remote outposts forced the Moroccans into a defensive 
position. Instead of seeking out the Polisario through desert operations, the Moroccans 
focused on the “useful triangle” between El Aaiun, Smara and Bukra. However, Polisario 
attacks became quite dangerous. By 1977, Moroccan causalities included 4,200 dead, 
2,800 wounded, and 96 imprisoned. In order to take a somewhat offensive position, 
Moroccan began using mechanized army units and air power in 1979.150 However, air 
attacks produced less-than-satisfactory results due to the Polisario’s anti-aircraft 
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technology and training. By 1981, Morocco only controlled 10% of the Western Sahara 
territory. 
 From 1982 to 1991, Morocco built a series of walls called “The Berm.” It 
encircled about 200,000 km2 of the 260,000 km2 of the Western Sahara, forcing the 
Polisario to conduct concentrated attacks on the wall. The wall became extremely costly 
and only furthered a long war of attrition. By building the wall, Morocco had almost 
accepted that the conflict would conclude with a long-awaited stalemate. 
 The costs of the war put a heavy burden on the Moroccan economy. By 1983, 
Morocco was spending $1.9 billion a year on the conflict and maintain over 100,000 
troops just in the Western Sahara territory. This number turned to $1 million a day in 
1987.151 In 1984, Moroccan debt reached over $13 billion. The IMF even rescheduled 
debt payments, Morocco cut subsidies for basic foods, welfare, infrastructure, public 
investment, and had devalue its currency.152 According to the 1981 World Bank report, 
about 40% of the Moroccan population was living below poverty.153 Moreover, 
Morocco’s phosphate exports declined dramatically. Due to Polisario mine attacks, 
investors became reluctant to input their capital. The mining industry was only uplifted 
through U.S. investment.154  
Soaring security expenditures, the phosphate export collapse, increased cost of 
fuel imports, and rising food imports brought on widespread protests in 1981 and 1984, 
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with mostly antiwar propaganda.155 However, Morocco was only able to continue on 
financing the conflict through gifts from Saudi Arabia and weapon loans from the U.S.156 
With foreign economic support, the Moroccan military was able to attain 524 tanks, 785 
carriers, and 2000 artillery by the 1990s.157 Ultimately, Morocco would not economically 
been able to continue the conflict with the Polisario if it was not for its rich and invested 
interveners. 
 
The Impact of Interventions 
In many cases of extra-state war, military and economic interventions overlap, 
making it extremely difficult to isolate the effect of each type of intervention. However, 
the Western Sahara War had relatively limited military intervention when compared to 
the excessive instances of economic intervention. On the side of the Polisario, Algeria 
engaged in two small-scale skirmishes at the start of the conflict. This intervention was 
not even planned or intentional, but arose more out of spontaneous conflict between 
Moroccan and Algerian troops. Morocco entered the war in a coalition with Mauritania, 
but Mauritania left the conflict in three years. Even in those three years, Mauritania 
committed a relatively low number of troops and material resources. On top of that, their 
involvement was largely supported by the French. Both these interventions were limited 
and did not extensively alter the military capabilities of the either actor. The Algerian 
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skirmishes did not enhance or limit the Polisario’s ability to wage a guerilla war against 
Moroccan troops.  
 In the Moroccan-Mauritanian case, Mauritania’s intervention forced the Polisario 
to initially focus their attacks on them rather than on the Moroccans. In that sense, 
Morocco was able to buy time from 1976 to 1979 while not facing the brunt of the 
Polisario attacks. The two-front war temporally extended Morocco’s ability to wage a 
longer war with the Polisario. It did not have to expend as many resources or lose as 
many troops while the Polisario concentrated their efforts against Mauritania. 
 What these military interventions have in common is that they brought in 
economic interventions. Algeria became more firm in its campaign against Morocco after 
seeing how the skirmishes in Amgala turned out. Mauritania’s weakness brought on 
French support. Moreover, when Mauritania signed the peace agreement, the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia saw a weak Morocco in much need of military and financial aid. The 
seemingly endless flow of aid made it impossible for either side to achieve a military 
solution, eventually leading to a stalemate.158 The economic interventions increased the 
ability to wage war without shortening the duration. This could be attributed to the idea 
that all the powers involved preferred an endless war to a solution where the other side 
comes out stronger. Consequently, foreign powers continued to give more and more 
assistance to persuade the other side to surrender. This, in essence, led to a regional arms 
race between the Polisario and Morocco, prolonging the conflict.159 Each side was able to 
                                               
158 Yahia Zoubir, International Dimensions of the Western Saharan Conflict, (Westport: Praeger 
Publishers, 1993), 164. 
159 Ibid., 165. 
67 
 
obtain the resources to continue the conflict. In other words, they did not face enough 
economic pressure to actively seek some sort of settlement. It was only in the late 1980s, 
when the conflict was no longer considered a war due to the low intensity, that the two 
sides realized how the conflict had exhausted their resources and capabilities. 
 In the Western Sahara case, military intervention inadvertently brought on 
economic intervention. Although the military intervention itself did not extensively alter 
the paradigm of the conflict, it allowed for economic interventions to raise the 
capabilities of both sides. With higher military capabilities, both actors felt less pressure 
to compromise and continued fighting in hopes of getting a settlement that would solely 
benefit them. 
 In other words, this case supports the hypothesis that an equitable distribution of 
military interventions increases war duration. In the Western Saharan case, military 
intervention brought on economic support. The economic support increased the 
capabilities of both sides, making it seem like each side could achieve their initial goals. 
Hence, the conflict continued without any real attempt at compromise. 
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The Cisplatine War, 1825-1828 
The Cisplatine War took place from 1825 to 1828 and was initially between 
Brazil and a small guerilla group from Buenos Aires called the 33 Orientals. This conflict 
was over a contested territory called La Banda Oriental (later to become Uruguay). Due 
to the low intensity level of violence, this conflict on its own could not be considered a 
war. However, this conflict sparked a larger militarized conflict between the United 
Provinces of the River Plate (later to become Argentina) and Brazil. The war ended in 
1828 due to British mediation. 
In 1825, the United Provinces of the River Plate was not an internationally 
recognized state and was, more accurately, a loose confederation of provinces.160 
Therefore, the Cisplatine War falls under the extra-state categorization because it was a 
conflict between a system member (the Empire of Brazil) and a non-system member (The 
United Provinces of the River Plate). 
The Cisplatine War was chosen to test hypothesis 4: diplomatic intervention by an 
international organization or neutral third party will decrease duration. This case falls 
under the Estimating Longitudinal group. There is no previous quantitative data support 
or rejecting this hypothesis and the case focuses mostly on the independent variable of 
diplomatic intervention. The Cisplatine War does not have clear evidence of influential, 
external military and economic intervention. Therefore, the characteristics of this case 
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will make it simpler to understand the relationship between diplomatic intervention and 
extra-state war duration.  
According to Slantchev and Cunningham, a third party facilitates an exchanging 
of information, decreasing the degree of uncertainty. In essence, the third party becomes 
a channel to exchange and negotiate information.161 However, it is also important to note 
that the character of the third party is vital. The third party needs to be a state or 
organization that is legitimate and powerful in the eyes of the actors. In the Cisplatine 
War, the British diplomatic intervention was successful in shortening the duration of the 
war because both actors were economically dependent on Great Britain.  
 
Historical Overview 
 The border between Portuguese Brazil and the Spanish Empire had been 
contentious since the 1680s. By the 18th century, Portugal had occupied most of the 
Banda Oriental, while Spain developed small towns in the region like Montevideo. In the 
early 1800s, Jose Gervasio Artigas led a war of independence for the region for almost a 
decade. However, in 1821, a questionable referendum gave control of the land to Brazil. 
The United Provinces of the River Plate (UPRP) never accepted those results. 
 In 1825, one of Artigas’ former lieutenants, Juan Antonio Lavalleja led an 
expedition with 33 “Orientals” from Buenos Aires to the Banda Oriental.162 Lavalleja 
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waged war on April 19, 1825 and gathered 200 more men from Buenos Aires within a 
few days.163 Fructoso Rivera, another former lieutenant, along with 500 men, later joined 
him. As they spread their way into the Banda Oriental, they gathered thousands of 
supporters.164 Within six months, they controlled a large section of the region with only 
Montevideo and Colonia still under Brazilian rule.165 
 On August 25, 1825, they organized the Uruguayn Assembly, which voted to 
denounce Brazilian rule, and opted for either independence or joining the UPRP. Prior to 
this event, the UPRP was too decentralized with almost no army or navy to speak of in 
order to give open support to the rebels. However, Buenos Aires became an unofficial 
base for supplying volunteers, munitions, and supplies.166 Through private donations 
from wealthy families in Buenos Aires, the rebels received 16,000 pesos within the first 
couple of months of their expedition.167  
 However, the UPRP was witnessing dramatic expansions in foreign investment 
and commerce with about 2 million pounds in trade a year. Half of this was just with 
Great Britain.168 With Brazilian militarization in the Banda Oriental, the UPRP began 
making plans for precautious military expansion while still maintaining a policy of 
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neutrality.169 Seeing this, Brazil began making plans for a blockade of Buenos Aires 
stirring up further animosities from the UPRP. The UPRP reversed its policy of 
neutrality, applauded the Uruguayan Assembly, and welcomed them into the United 
Provinces.170 Ultimately, Brazil, armed with the strongest navy in the Americas at that 
time, declared war on the UPRP on December 10, 1825.171 The many battles that erupted 
in the Banda Oriental usually did not have a clear winner. The UPRP was standing its 
own for much of the war, creating a military stalemate between the two powers.172 At the 
same time, Brazil was maintaining a very successful blockade on the port of Buenos 
Aires, only allowing neutral vessels access at the end of 1826.173 Prices in the UPRP 
skyrocketed as the blockade strangled the economy. In response, the UPRP issued about 
118 privateering licenses between 1826 and 1827, allowing individual privateers to attack 
and loot Brazilian ships.174  
 Foreign traders made it known that they were unhappy with the trade restrictions. 
Privateering had to be put on hold at the peak of its success because of the complaints 
received about foreign ships being attacked and looted.175 As both the UPRP’s and 
Brazil’s population felt the effects of a wartime economy, public skirmishes and revolts 
became commonplace. As Brazil was trying to handle the UPRP, the Oriental rebels took 
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advantage of the unoccupied theatre of war and took control of most of the Banda 
Oriental by 1827.176  
 The UPRP understood that a military stalemate would only deplete its resource 
seven further. In 1827, it sent MJ Garcia to Rio de Janeiro in hopes of an armistice with 
an independent Banda Oriental. However, negotiations failed as Brazil was adamant 
about keeping the region.177 This failure resulted in the emergence of a new UPRP 
government under the decentralization-favoring Federalist Party.178 
 Brazil, also feeling the economic effects of the war, tried to accelerate the conflict 
in 1827 by tightening the blockade, capturing, and destroying privateer ships.179 
However, these actions only exacerbated foreign grievances. Ultimately, the British 
negotiated a peace agreement on August 27, 1828, known as the Treaty of Montevideo. 
This agreement granted the Banda Oriental independence from both powers, allowing it 
to develop into the state of Uruguay.180 
 
Capabilities and Costs 
 At the start of the conflict, Brazil had a presence of about 6000 troops in the 
Banda Oriental. Montevideo hosted 2500 troops, Colonia had about 1100, and 1500 men 
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were dispersed through the region.181 After the “Orientals” began attacking Brazilian 
bases and regiments, Brazil sent about ten gunboats/schooners along with armed ships 
carrying 1200 more troops.182 On top of that, the Brazilian navy was composed of about 
65 fighting vessels, 690 guns, 21 launches, 74 gunships, 6 frigates, 18 brigs, 19 
schooners, and 16 small gunboats.183  
 In comparison, the “Orientals” numbered around a few thousand individuals by 
the end of 1826 with only basic guns and bayonets for defense. Despite the capability 
gap, the insurgency group outperformed Brazil’s military, leading to a military stalemate 
in the Banda Oriental.184 The “Orientals” had greater knowledge of the terrain and were 
able to rally the rural population, making it difficult for the Brazilians to distinguish 
between civilian and combatant. By 1827, the “Orientals” controlled the entire region 
except for Montevideo and Colonia. 
 Another reason for the stalemate was Brazil’s divided attention between the 
“Orientals” and the UPRP’s professional military. In 1825, the UPRP had barely an army 
or navy to speak of. However, it began making plans to expand its military in order to 
further consolidate the federation. In 1825, the UPRP began making plans to purchase six 
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gunboats and three frigates. By 1826, it had purchased 11 gunboats for port defense of 
Buenos Aires.185 
 The UPRP knew that the only way to defend against the Brazilian blockade was 
through utilizing a strong navy. It spent nearly 4.5 million pesos on rebuilding the navy, 
where half of that money was used just to buy ships. The central government was 
attempting to use the war to consolidate power. In the February of 1826, the government 
set up a presidential magistracy even though the official republic did not exist yet. 
President Rivadavia spearheaded the consolidation movement but soon ran into economic 
barriers. The UPRP’s government income was about 1.2 million pesos a year. However, 
the war was costing the government 600,000 pesos a month. Most of the costs were taken 
on by Buenos Aires, but the government also issued excessive banknotes and decreased 
cash backing. Coupled with the blockade, these actions led to high inflation rates and 
skyrocketed prices. Food shortages soon became commonplace.186 The Argentinian Civil 
War could trace its origins to this era due to the extreme conflict between centralists and 
federalists over what direction the federation should take in terms of consolidation.187 
 Although Brazil already had a strong navy to begin with, the costs of war also 
took a toll on the country. The privateering attacks severely hurt Brazilian trade. 
Consequently, Brazilians were having a harder time paying for everyday goods. Due to 
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the lack of resources, skirmishes became monthly occurrences as public opinion on the 
war dropped.  
 For the first, two years of the war, Pedro I proved inflexible on the war, arguing 
that the nation’s honor would not allow him to retreat from the Cisplatine province. 
However, with the onslaught of public protests, he began to waver in his determination 
for the Banda Oriental.188 The UPRP sent MJ Garcia in 1827 to find an end to the war, 
but due to miscommunication and resolve to not appear weak in front of their adversary, 
the peace agreement fell through.  
 
British Diplomatic Intervention 
 The war ended when the British drafted the Treaty of Montevideo on August 27, 
1828 asking both actors to withdraw from the Banda Oriental region and allow self-
determination. Their economic interests and their need to maintain an advantageous 
position in both nations by preserving a balance of power mostly spurred the British.189 
British trade with Brazil was around 2.6 million pounds annually, while its trade with the 
UPRP was around 1 million pounds annually.190 The blockade, privateering, and 
consequent effects of both nations’ economies severely damaged British trade 
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connections. In 1828, both nations were still stuck in their stalemate, without the proper 
communication lines to compromise. 
 Apart from trade, the British had other connections to the two nations. In the 
UPRP, there was a British community of 3000 individuals who settled in the region due 
to commercial opportunities, good wages, cheap cost of living, and religious tolerance.191 
In Brazil, one-third of the naval officers were British, due to the shortage of skilled 
Brazilians.192 On top of that, Great Britain enjoyed a special place in Brazilian politics 
because the Portugal court sailed under British protection to Brazil during the Napoleonic 
wars.193 
 The British were pivotal in ending the war because both the UPRP and Brazil had 
an incentive to listen to the British. Moreover, although both sides wanted to end the war, 
there was too much discord, animosity, and fear of public uproar for these nations to 
actively seek out peace. They both invested three years into the conflict, and felt that the 
war would be worthless if they did not come out with the Banda Oriental. The British, as 
an economic superior, were able to end the conflict by not allowing either side to gain the 
Banda Oriental. By doing this, the British minimized the potential for future conflict over 
the region, while also creating a buffer state between the two nations.  
 Ultimately, the diplomatic intervention by the British was effective because Great 
Britain was a nation that both the UPRP and Brazil had an incentive to please. Moreover, 
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the clauses of the agreement made it that neither nation truly won or lost, maintaining 
national honor on both sides. 
 
Conclusion and Counterfactuals 
 The Cisplatine case was analyzed to test whether diplomatic intervention shortens 
war duration. This case does support that hypothesis. However, the question is whether 
the conflict would have ended around the same time even without British intervention.  
 From the state of their economies, and their political turmoil, both nations wanted 
the war to end soon. Brazil was even tightening the blockade in order to accelerate and 
finish off the war. That being said, if the UPRP and Brazil had to negotiate on the Band 
Oriental by themselves, a peace agreement would have taken much longer to form. They 
needed a neutral third party like the British to almost coerce them through soft power into 
finalizing an agreement. Neither side wanted to give up the Banda Oriental, a territory 
they spent three years fighting for. However, British mediation made it that neither side 
could get that territory, and therefore maintaining a balance of power. On top of that, 
British involvement ensured that neither side could break the tenants of the treaty without 
facing consequences from Great Britain. By having an economically and militarily more 
powerful nation keeping a check on the situation, the conflict would have a much harder 
time to re-emerge.  
Great Britain served as a legitimate negotiation channel for Brazil and the UPRP. 
Without it, both sides would have continued to fight until they exhausted their resources. 
At the time of the diplomatic intervention, both sides were not in too dire of 
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circumstances that they would have ended the war right there and then. It was through 
British-aided negotiations that they were able to end the conflict at the time that they did. 
In terms of Slantchev’s and Cunningham’s argument, Great Britain allowed the two sides 
to exchange and negotiate information that they would not have been able to exchange 
before. It is through this mechanism that the Cisplatine War support the hypothesis that 
diplomatic intervention shortens war duration. 
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Mozambican War of Independence, 1964-1975 
 The Mozambican War of Independence took place from 1964 to 1975. This 
conflict was between Portugal and guerilla group known as the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) over the fate of independence for Mozambique. Out of the 
three cases being analyzed in this paper, this case is the only case of a “colonial” war. 
Portugal, the colonizer state, fought a non-state actor (FRELIMO) in its colony, 
Mozambique. This war did not have any significant military or diplomatic intervention. 
However, each side attracted substantial economic support/intervention throughout the 
duration of the war. The war ultimately ended in a negotiated agreement for 
Mozambique’s independence in 1975.  
 This case was chosen to test hypothesis 5: economic support for either side of the 
conflict will increase duration. Although the Western Saharan War touched on the effects 
of economic intervention, it did not isolate economic intervention. The Mozambican War 
of Independence case is within the Estimating Longitudinal group. Apart from the 
Western Saharan case, there is no empirical data in this paper so far to support or reject 
hypothesis 5. I chose the Mozambique case in order to focus on the independent variable 
of economic intervention. As previously mentioned, there were no significant instances 
of military or diplomatic intervention, making it simpler to isolate and concentrate on the 
effect of economic intervention.  
 In other words, the analysis of this case is assessing whether economic support 
has an effect on war duration, and through what mechanisms it might have an effect. In 
line with Vasquez, any form of wartime alliances, including economic alliances, would 
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result in longer wars. This is due to the pooling of resources, which reduces the cost of 
war preparations for the actors in the conflict.194 Similarly, Elbadawi argues that external 
interventions increase the duration of a war by reducing the cost of coordinating or 
fighting the opponent.195 Although these two researchers focused on mostly military 
interventions, the same rationale applies for economic interventions. When actors in a 
conflict receive economic aid, their ability to continue fighting is increased, allowing 
them to pursue their original war goals rather than opting for compromise. Their military 
capability is indirectly boosted through loans, financing, and arms sales. The increased 
capability translates into continuing the conflict until one actor reaches their goals or runs 
out of steam. 
 In the case of the Mozambican War of Independence, economic support plays a 
vital role in the duration of the conflict. FRELIMO, an initially small and unequipped 
guerilla group, depended on foreign arms and training to launch successful attacks on the 
Portuguese. Similarly, Portugal, under economic constraints, needed loans to finance this 
war while maintaining economic development back home. Without economic support, 
neither side would have had the resources to organize an effective or long-lasting 
campaign.  
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Historical Overview 
 Mozambique had been a colony of Portugal since the 1500s after Vasco de Gama 
rounded the cape of Africa. For many centuries, Portugal treated Mozambique as an 
overseas province useful as a trade partner and a setting to produce goods.196 However, 
this translated into a repressive regime for native Mozambicans. In the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, Mozambique was not immune to the wave of nationalist and independence 
movements sweeping Africa and Asia. Several nationalist groups had coexisted for a 
quite a number of years by this period. In 1962, the Front for the Liberation of 
Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed under President Mondlane as a coalition amongst 
already existing nationalist groups.197 Some of the participating groups were the 
Mozambique National Democratic Union, the Mozambique Independence Union, and the 
Mozambique African National Union.198 This group formed in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
due to the strict and repressive regime in Mozambique.199 Mondlane hoped the coalition 
would represent a united front, pool resources, and coordinate military efforts. These 
would be the key to victory.200 
 Already embroiled in an unexpected independence war in Angola, Portugal began 
making military preparations in Mozambique as soon as FRELIMO began forming. From 
1961 to 1964, the Portuguese army in Mozambique grew from 4,000 units to 35,000 
units. They patrolled the Tanzanian border and frontier, created landing strips, and mortar 
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placements.201 Mozambique was a key gateway to the economic development and 
potential residing in Rhodesia, Zambia, and Malawi.202 In September of 1964, FRELIMO 
began its attack with raids. Although materially prepared, Portugal was expecting a raid 
from across the Tanzanian border. Instead, FRELIMO began their attacks from within 
Mozambique using guerilla tactics. They ambushed patrols, sabotaged communications 
and then faded into the Makonde highlands where they would receive food and 
information on government maneuvers. FRELIMO’s initial successes encouraged smaller 
raids into southern district, diverting troops from the northern region.203 Soon enough, 
FRELIMO controlled the northern regions of Mozambique or about one-fifth of the 
land.204 
 FRELIMO was not looking for a military victory. Rather, they aimed for a war of 
attrition in order to make the war costly enough for Portugal to negotiate 
independence.205 The first four years of the conflict saw FRELIMO success and 
Portuguese disorganization. However, by the late 1960s, FRELIMO’S success slowed 
down. Portuguese resistance and a unique resettlement program made recruitment and 
guerilla tactics difficult.206 Moreover, Mondlane was killed in 1969, leading to chaos 
amongst the leadership of FRELIMO. There was intense discussion on whether 
FRELIMO should take on an ideological direction.207 Prior to this, Mondlane strayed 
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away from ideology in order to garner support from both the East and West, while 
forging a wide coalition.208 A lack of funds, uncertainty over leadership, a large 
Portuguese counteroffensive, and difficulties in consolidation all contributed to 
FRELIMO’s declining success.209  
 The new leadership was conspicuously left-leaning and socialist. This sharpened 
agenda prompted an intensified military campaign, eventually attracting Chinese and 
Soviet involvement.210 Prior to this, FRELIMO only received a small number of arms and 
training from Algeria and Egypt.211 This new support from China and the Soviet Union 
bolstered FRELIMO and gave it new life.212 On the other side of the conflict, Portugal 
had been receiving NATO, US, French, and South African support for a couple years by 
now. It is with their training, arms, and loans that Portugal was able to effectively execute 
the counterinsurgency tactics that slowed FRELIMO down.213  
 However, the economic toll the three wars (Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-
Bissau) were taking on Portugal had consequences. A fervent antiwar movement and 
internal discontent developed within Portugal due to war weariness, hatred of the Caetano 
dictatorship, and socioeconomic hardships. On top of that, Portugal was dealing with a 
collapsing military position by the early 1970s. It was unable to contain the guerillas in 
remote regions and could not protect white civilians.214 FRELIMO was an unstoppable 
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force as it spread southward. Ultimately, Portugal agreed to begin talks on independence 
in February of 1974.215 However, the negotiations did not end the violence. FRELIMO 
captured cities like Murrumbala during the talks, plummeting army morale.216 
Unsurprisingly, Caetano was overthrown in Portugal in April of 1974.217 With new 
Portuguese leadership, the negotiations were sped up, leading to Mozambican 
independence on June 25, 1975.218 However, the new country would soon enter a bloody 
and long civil war.219 
 
Impact of Interventions 
 Prior to the start of the conflict, FRELIMO was receiving support from a handful 
of African and Middle Eastern countries. Tanzania acted as the host country for 
FRELIMO, offering it refuge, financial aid, training grounds, and a channel to request 
outside assistance.220 Without Tanzania, FRELIMO would have had a much harder time 
forming and consolidating its members. By June 1963, FRELIMO began preparations for 
its raids. With a starting number of 250 men in Mozambique, FRELIMO began to send 
recruits to Algeria and the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria) for guerilla 
training.221 Algeria and Egypt also provided a small number of arms to get FRELIMO 
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started in its pursuit for independence.222 FRELIMO’s determination to battle its 
colonizer triggered recent memories for Tanzania, Algeria, and Egypt. Their assistance 
was their method of showing support for anti-colonial movements across Africa. 
 From the guerilla training in Algeria and knowledge of the terrain, FRELIMO 
started off their raids with relative success with rising Portuguese casualties.223 Their 
mission for independence coupled with this success made recruitment easier.224 From 
only 250 men in 1964, FRELIMO grew to 2000 by 1965, 8000 by 1967, and 10,000 by 
1969.225 However, within a couple years, Portugal developed stronger counterinsurgency 
tactics, slowing FRELIMO’s southward movement.226 During this time, Mondlane sought 
out diplomacy and propaganda. He aimed to get a wider audience and engender 
legitimacy by printing bulletins, hosting tours for journalists, and making visits to foreign 
states, all while remaining ideologically unshackled.227 Algeria acted as a distribution 
center for propaganda as well as a transit point between Tanzania and Europe for 
FRELIMO members.228 However, Mondlane’s death and the rising costs of this war 
caught up to FRELIMO. It is at this point that FRELIMO leaders begin looking 
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elsewhere for assistance. Seeing FRELIMO’s leftward movement, China begins sending 
advisers to train recruits in Tanzania.229 
 By the early 1970s, FRELIMO was receiving Chinese, Russian, and Czech 
weaponry along with key guerilla training from the Chinese. Chinese training involved 
small arms tactics and explosive effectiveness.230 For example, Chinese advisers 
instructed FRELIMO to scale down their units to six men in what was called “tactics of 
the ants.” This small unit size allowed FRELIMO to increase the number of raids, while 
diminishing vulnerability to retaliation.231 The Soviets provided AK 47s, 122 mm rocket 
launchers, and antiaircraft machine guns.232 By the early 1970s, the individual guerilla 
fighter was more equipped than the individual Portuguese soldier.233 
 The training and weapons the Soviet Union and China provided increased 
FRELIMO’s effectiveness dramatically. They were able to control most of the northern 
regions of Mozambique and eventually make their way down south to capture other 
major cities. Their recruitment increased due to this success. By 1974, FRELIMO was 
composed of over 13,000 fighters and 25,000 party activists.234 Moreover, the 
Organization of African Unity began providing material and logistical support after 
witnessing FRELIMO’s rise within Mozambique.235 
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 The economic support provided by Tanzania, Algeria, and Egypt were crucial in 
FRELIMO’s development and initial success. This initial success brought the attention of 
bigger players such as China and the Soviet Union when FRELIMO needed it the most.  
Without the training and weaponry provided by these two countries, FRELIMO would 
have fallen victim to Portugal’s COIN strategies and superior military. Therefore, the 
economic interventions on the side of FRELIMO allowed it to continue playing a major 
role in the conflict, and therefore elongating the conflict. 
 By the time Portugal got into the Mozambican Independence War, it was already 
fighting two independence movements in Angola and Guinea-Bissau. Prepared to fight 
FRELIMO, Portugal put about 70,000 men in Mozambique.236 However, unprepared for 
FRELIMO’s guerilla raids and fighting three different wars put economic and military 
strain on Portugal. At the start of the conflict, Portugal did not have any armored vehicles 
in Mozambique and only had five aircrafts.237 In an attempt to militarily expand in 
Mozambique, Portugal poured money into increasing the number of soldiers. However, 
only a portion of the military presence could be used to fighting FRELIMO directly. 
Portugal had to use their soldiers to protect infrastructure and white towns. Actually, only 
about 30,000 of the 70,000 Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique were used in combat.238  
 The military campaigns began eating away almost half of the state’s budget, 
which became increasingly more difficult to explain to citizens who demanded economic 
development.239 In addition, Portugal incited West Germany to set up bases in Portugal to 
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fill the military gap left at home. This only weakened the regime’s support base because 
it was allowing foreign military into its borders.240 Moreover, since FRELIMO had the 
advantage of choosing the time and place for raids, Portugal saw an increase in 
causalities in the first three years of the conflict with about 4000 dead.241  
 Portuguese defense costs doubled between 1960 and 1970, forcing the 
government to impose higher taxes and increase importation of goods. By 1973, the war 
was costing Portugal $70 million: a cost it just could not support on its own.242 
 From the mid-1960s, Portugal began receiving aid from NATO, the U.S., South 
Africa, and certain European countries due to the costliness of this war.243 NATO, 
through the UK, France, and the U.S, .provided arms, training in COIN, and financing. 
This aid could not be used within Portugal’s colonies. However, NATO aid freed up 
Portugal’s military requirement in its own country, allowing it to use its resources in its 
colonies. South Africa, France, Germany also provided arms to Portugal’s army in 
Mozambique.244 The U.S. gave about $48 million in military aid between 1961 and 1968. 
After 1968, it continued to give $5 million annually.245 
 By 1967, Portugal was receiving generous loans which it invested in its military 
in Mozambique.246 In fact, Portugal became extremely dependent on these loans because 
by 1968, about 49% of its annual budget went to the army. It was forced to borrow 
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money. Internal debt rose by about 23% and foreign debt rose by almost 40%.247 
Weakened by three wars, internal turmoil, and military ineffectiveness, Portugal would 
not have been able to continue the war without economic support. It did not have the 
resources on its own to support a military of 70,000 in Mozambique. With NATO and 
other allies, Portugal somehow managed to keep its budget intact (although stretched) for 
the many years of the war. In 1974, a coup and dire economic circumstances forced 
Portugal to accept FRELIMO’s calls for independence. Without foreign support, Portugal 
most likely would have given into FRELIMO’s demands years in advance. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Mozambican War of Independence was almost dependent on economic 
support for both sides. This case does support the hypothesis that economic intervention, 
in the form of support, can increase the duration of an extra-state war. In this case, 
FRELIMO could not have formed nor gained its initial rise without the aid of certain 
African countries. It was only able to increase its military effectiveness and eventual 
success with economic support from China and the Soviet Union. Without any of this 
support, FRELIMO would have been defeated or become inconsequential within the first 
four years of the war. Portugal was in an unfavorable situation. It had to deal with three 
different wars of independence in its African colonies. Without NATO and ally support, 
                                               
247 Luis B. Serapiao and A. El-Khawas, Mozambique in the Twentieth Century: From Colonialism to 
Independence, (Lanham: University Press of America, 1975), 246. 
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Portugal would have either given independence sooner or collapsed from economic 
overextension.  
 Much like Vasquez and Elbadawi argued, the reason economic intervention 
played such a pivotal role in this conflict is because it reduced the cost of fighting. This, 
in turn, allows the two actors to continue fighting for a longer period of time in hopes of 
achieving their original goal. Compromise becomes less desirable when there is a 
potential for winning completely. In the Mozambican case, after FRELIMO received 
Chinese and Soviet assistance, it truly believed it could achieve independence. Similarly, 
Portugal continued the conflict, with economic support, believing that it could crush the 
FRELIMO movement. If one of the sides could no longer find the resources to fight, 
which is what eventually happened with Portugal, we would have seen a call for 
negotiation much earlier on. Ultimately, the economic intervention in the Mozambican 
War of Independence increased the capabilities of both actors, and therefore, increased 
the duration of the war. 
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Conclusion 
 
 Although extra-state wars may not be as plentiful as interstate or intrastate wars, 
they have been numerous enough to warrant attention and discussion. The question 
driving this paper was how intervention factors in extra-state war duration. The goal of 
this research is twofold. On one hand, I hoped to understand whether intervention effects 
extra-state war duration and how it would do so. On the other hand, the study of extra-
state war duration or extra-state wars in general is not exhausted. This research is meant 
to begin a debate on extra-state wars, and bring more research and understanding on the 
characteristics and variables involved with this type of war. 
 In terms of empirical evidence, the regression analysis focused on the first two 
hypotheses. These hypotheses were on how military intervention effects duration. The 
regression analysis supported one out of the two hypotheses. Overall, the analysis 
supported the idea that military intervention, regardless of which side it is on, is 
correlated with higher durations. However, since this regression analysis could only focus 
on military intervention and could only prove correlation, I also conducted three case 
studies. 
 The first case, the Western Saharan War, was chosen to test the hypothesis that 
military interventions on both sides of the conflict increases the duration. The second 
case, the Cisplatine War, tested whether diplomatic intervention decreases duration. 
Lastly, the third case, the Mozambican War of Independence, looked into whether 
economic support increases war duration. All three cases supported their respective 
hypotheses. It is important to note that these cases cannot singlehandedly prove their 
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hypotheses. Rather, they allowed me to locate potential causal mechanisms between 
intervention and war duration. For example, the Mozambican War of Independence 
showed that economic support increases war duration by reducing the cost of fighting. 
 This research has not definitively proved that certain types of intervention 
increase war duration and other types decrease it. Instead, it lends support to the 
previously outlined hypotheses and allows others to weigh in on the same matter. This 
topic has important policy implications. Political leaders need to address what their goals 
are when planning on an intervention. Do they want to make sure one side definitively 
wins or are they hoping to put an end to it? Depending on the answer to that question, 
they can decide on the type of intervention. 
 Further research is definitely needed for this topic. Would the results change if the 
intensity of the military intervention were accounted for? How would a survival analysis 
rather than a regression analysis affect the data? Moreover, how does a war like the 
Syrian Civil War fall into the typology of wars? Is it just an intrastate war or are there 
elements of interstate and extra-state conflict? These research questions show the 
potential breadth of this topic. Extra-state wars are prevalent enough to warrant more 
study. 
 Ultimately, this paper supports the hypothesis that intervention does factor into 
extra-state war duration. Intervention can be a tool or weapon for third parties to use and 
has pivotal implications for the arch of extra-state wars. Hopefully, state leaders are 
aware of the consequences of their interventions into future extra-state wars.  
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